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Summary findings
Queisser  and Vittas provide  a detailed  study  of the Swiss  benefits  exceeding  obligatory  levels.  The second  pillar
pension system,  analyzing  its strengths  and weaknesses.  has accumulated  large  financial  resources,  equivalent  to
The unfunded  public  pillar is highly  redistributive.  It  125  percent of GDP.  Investment  returns  have historically
has  near universal  coverage,  a low dispersion  of benefits  been low, but a shift in asset allocation  in favor of
(the maximum  public  pension  is twice  the minimum),  equities  and international  assets  has increased  reported
and no ceiling  on contributions.  Low-income  pensioners  returns  in recent  years.
receive  means-tested  supplementary  benefits.  Payroll  The third (voluntary)  pillar covers  self-employed
taxes  are low, but government  transfers  cover 27 percent  workers  and others not covered  by the second  pillar. It
of total benefits.  Total benefits  amount  to 9.1 percent of  plays  a rather small  role in the system.
GDP,  equivalent  to 15.2 percent of covered  earnings.  Many  of the positive  features  of the Swiss  pension
The funded  private  pillar was made compulsory  in a  system  are not due to some  grand original  design  but are
defensive  move against  the relentless  expansion  of the  instead  the result of periodic  revisions.  In large  part they
public  pillar. The compulsory  pillar stipulates  minimum  reflect  the collective  common  sense  of the Swiss  people
benefits  in the form of age-related  credits,  a minimum  in voting for stable  and fiscally  prudent social  benefits.
interest  rate on accumulated  credits, and a minimumr  However,  the Swiss  system  also  has some weaknesses.  As
annuity  conversion  factor, aimed  to smooth changes  in  in many other countries,  the public  pillar faces  a
interest rates over time. Low-income  workers are not  deteriorating  system  dependency  ratio, due to
required  to participate  in the second  pillar.  The first and  demographic  aging  and a large increase  in disability
second  pillars  as well as supplementary  benefits  are  pensions.  The second  pillar is fragmented  (more  than
admirably  integrated.  4,000 funds  with affiliates),  lacks  transparency,  and has
Company  pension plans are free to set terms and  achieved  low investment  returns.
conditions  in excess  of these  minimums,  and most olfer
This paper-a  product  of Finance,  Development  Research  Group-is  part of a larger  effort in the group to study  pension
systems  and assess  the role of public  and private  as well  as funded  and unfunded  pillars. Copies  of the paper are available
free from  the World Bank,  1818 H Street  NW, Washiington,  DC 20433. Please  contact  Agnes  Yaptenco,  room MC3-444,
telephone  202-473-1823,  fax 202-522-1155,  email  address  ayaptenco@worldbank.org.  Policy  Research  Working  Papers
are also posted on  the Web at  www.worldbank.org/research/workingpapers.  The authors may be contacted at
monika.queisser@oecd.org  or dvittas@worldbank.org.  August  2000. (83 pages)
The Policy  Research  Working  Paper  Series  disseminates  the findings  of work in progress  to encourage  the exchange  of ideas  about
development  issues.  An objective  of the series  is to get the (indings  out quickly,  even if the  presentations  are  less than  fully polished.  The
papers  carry  the names  of the authors  and should  be cited  accordingly.  The findings,  interpretations,  and conclusions  expressed  in this
paper  are  entirely  those  of the authors.  They do not necessarily  represent  the view of the World  Bank,  its Executive  Directors,  or the
countries  they represent.
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iiI.  INTRODUCTION  AND MAIN FINDINGS
1.1  Introduction
This paper' is motivated  by three basic questions.  What accounts  for the
"excellent"  design  of the unfunded  public  pillar  of the Swiss pension  system?  Being  a
thrifty  nation,  why did the Swiss people  vote in a 1972  referendum  for a mandatory
funded  private  pillar? And  having  established  such a pillar,  why has the real rate  of return
been so low? 2
To answer  these three questions  it is necessary  to address  two supplementary
ones:  What are the main features  of the first pillar  that could  justify its characterization  as
"excellent"?  And  what are the main features  of the second  pillar that could explain  its
relative  underperformance?
Answering  these five questions  is not an easy task. As in most other countries,  the
Swiss pension  system  is highly complex  and has myriads  of detailed  provisions  that are
difficult  to summarize,  let alone evaluate.  The system  has been evolving  over time and
evaluating  its performance  is like aiming at a moving  target.  Moreover,  the lack of
transparency  of some  aspects  of the second  pillar  increases  the difficulty  of this exercise.
However,  using the information  that is available  and contrasting  the Swiss  experience
with that of other  countries,  this paper  makes an attempt  at answering  these five questions
and in the process  offering  an analytical  overview  of the Swiss  pension  system.
The structure  of the paper is as follows.  The remainder  of the introduction
provides  a brief historical  perspective,  a summary  of main findings,  and an overall
assessment.  Chapter  II offers a more detailed  discussion  of the main features  of the
unfunded  public  pillar,  Chapter III covers  the funded  private  pillar and Chapter  IV
reviews  the voluntary  third pillar. Annex  I documents  briefly  the historical  evolution  of
the Swiss pension  system and Annex  II contains  all the statistical  tables.
I  Monika  Queisser  is Principal  Administrator,  Social  Policy  Division,  OECD  and  Dimitri  Vittas is
Lead Economist,  Development  Research  Group,  The World  Bank. We are indebted  to many Swiss  experts
and especially  to Martin  Janssen,  Markus  Nievergelt  and Werner  Nussbaum  for their comments  and
suggestions.  We are also  grateful  to Estelle  James  for her valuable  insights.
2  Some  Swiss  experts  maintain  that the design  of the public  pillar is not excellent,  while the real
returns  of the funded  private  pillar are not very low. While  all pension  systems  have shortcomings,  the
Swiss  system  has fewer  weaknesses  than those of most other  countries.  Regarding  investment  returns,
some large  pension  funds seem  to eam high returns,  that are comparable  to those reported  by Anglo-
American  funds,  but for the whole  of the sector,  most international  surveys  show  much lower  returns  for
Swiss  pension  funds.
11.2  Historical  Perspective
Like most OECD countries, Switzerland has a multi-pillar pension system. It
comprises an unfunded and highly redistributive public pillar, a funded occupational
pillar, and a pillar based on personal savings.  The first two are compulsory and the third
voluntary 3. The three pension pillars have many interesting features that support and
reinforce each other and make for a very coherent whole.  But the Swiss system also has a
number of important weaknesses.
Switzerland is the first country that articulated publicly the benefits of a multi-
pillar pension system in a 1963 report accompanying the sixth revision of the old age and
survivors pension system 4. Switzerland also was the first OECD country to introduce a
mandatory funded but privately managed second pillar.
The national (federal) public pillar for old age and survivor pensions was
introduced in 1948. It absorbed pre-existing cantonal systems, the first of which was
established in 1904 (Helbling 1991:27). Disability pensions were offered in 1960. The
occupational pillar, which became comrpulsory  in 1985, also built on pre-existing
voluntary occupational plans. Such plans covered 40 percent of the labor force in 1970.
The assets of occupational pension funds already amounted to 31% of GDP in 1942, 40%
in 1970 and as high as 65% in 1984 (Hlelbling 1991:28). The second pillar is in fact a
mixed compulsory/voluntary pillar as most of the large employers offer benefits that go
well beyond the prescribed minimal requirements. The voluntary third pillar covers the
self-employed workers, dependent workers who are not covered by the second pillar, and
additional retirement savings made by employees who are already covered by the second
pillar.
In both compulsory pillars, there was considerable delay between the acceptance
of constitutional amendments and enactment of implementing legislation.  The first pillar
took 22 years to implement, following the passing of a constitutional amendment in
December 1925 and introduction of the federal public pillar in January 19485.  The long
delay was caused by the intervening economic depression and Second World War, but it
may also reflect the cautious attitude of the Swiss people and their concern for sound
financing (Charles 1993:13).
3  In reality  , the Swiss  system  has six components: the public  pillar is supported by the offer  of
noncontributory  supplementary  benefits; the pirivate  pillar can be divided  into the legally  required  benefits
and the super-obligatory  benefits,  which continue  to play a large  part in the private  pillar; and  the third
pillar comprises  "tied individual  retirement  savings"  that benefit  from tax incentives  and other  personal
savings.
4  The approach  was publicized  in the Lausanne  Fair of 1964  with  the graphical  presentation  of a
house  with  three more  or less equal  pillars  (Hel[bling  1991:23).
S  Annex I offers  a more detailed  but brief discussion  of the historical  evolution  of the first  and
second  pillars.
2Many of the most positive  features  of the public  pillar  that characterize  its current
design,  such as the low dispersion  between  maximum  and minimum  pensions,  the
proportionality  rule,  the extensive  government  co-financing,  the offer of supplementary
pensions,  the "Swiss"  indexation  of pension  benefits,  and  the splitting  of pension  benefits
between  spouses,  were not present  when the system  was first introduced.  These  features
were added in subsequent  revisions  of the system.
The structure  of the first pillar  is not therefore  the result of some grand  original
design  but rather a collective  response  to new challenges  and issues. As most changes
must be approved  in a referendum  vote, policymakers  are forced  to adopt measures  that
can win the support  of the majority  of Swiss people.  In a very real sense one can argue
that the excellent  design of the first pillar  is due to the common  sense of the Swiss  people
in voting for stable and viable  benefits  that satisfy  the strongly  felt need for solidarity,
while  maintaining  fiscal prudence.
Swiss social security  experts  emphasize  the concept  of total solidarity  on which
the first pillar  is based. This covers  solidarity  between  the generations,  income  groups,
sexes,  single and married  people,  regions,  and urban and rural  areas (Charles 1993:13-
14).  The main features  and principles  of the first pillar as a social insurance  scheme  based
on this concept  of intergenerational  and social solidarity  have remained  unchanged,  even
though  various refinements  have  been introduced  over the years.
T'he  referendum  making compulsory  the second  pillar was passed  in December
1972,  but the new compulsory  private pillar  was not introduced  until January  1985.  The
economic  problems  caused  by the oil crisis  of the early 1970s  were primarily  responsible
for the 12-year  delay,  but uncertainty  and debate  about the exact nature  of the mandate
and the typical  concern  for introducing  a sound system also were contributing  factors.
An important  aspect  of the "collective  common  sense"  that underpins  the Swiss
pension  system  is provided  by the brief history  behind  the adoption  of the mandatory
second  pillar. The first attempt  to make the second  pillar compulsory  was rejected  in
1968.  But when faced with an alternative  proposal  to nationalize  all existing occupational
pension  plans  and expand  the public  pillar  in 1972,  Swiss voters opted  for making  the
second  pillar  compulsory.  As discussed  in Helbling  (1991:29),  the 1972  vote was
effectively  a defensive  measure.  against  a relentless  expansion  of the public  pillar 6. This
probably  explains  why there was little concern  about  the long delay in implementing  the
constitutional  amendment.  The referendum  vote did not cover any of the details  of the
minimum  legal requirements  in designing  the second  pillar.
6  It is important  to note that at that time  neighboring  countries  (Austria,  France,  Germany  and Italy)
were in the process  of imnplementing  large  expansions  of their public  pillars.
31.3  Main Findings:  First  Pillar
Coverage
*  The public  pillar has achieved  near universal  coverage.  Since 1997,  all residents,
including  non-working  persons,  are required  to contribute  regardless  of their
employment  status.  In 1998,  3.8 million  people contributed  to the first pillar,  out
of a total economically  active  population  of 4.3 million  people.
Benefits
*  Pension  benefits  are modest  and are characterized  by low dispersion.  The
maximum  public  pension  is aboul 40 percent  of average  earnings,  while  the minimum
pension  amounts  to about 20 percent.
*  A progressive  benefit formula  that is resistant  to strategic  manipulation  is used.
Recent  changes  in the benefit  formnula,  coupled  with the use of supplementary
benefits,  suggest  a gradual  move toward  "flat" benefits.
•  Normal  retirement  ages at 65 for men and 62 for women  are reasonable  (that of
women  is scheduled  to rise gradually  to 64 by 2001),  while early retirement  is
discouraged.
*  Disability pensions have increased much faster than old age pensions. In the early
and mid-1990s,  this reflected  the use of disability  pensions  for dealing  with the
growing  unemployment  of older vworkers  in declining  industries.  Disability  pensions
convert  to old age pensions  on reaching  the normal  retirement  age.
- Low-income  earners  and disabled  workers  have a high replacement  rate from the
public  pillar.  But because  minimum  pensions  are below  the official  poverty  line,
means-tested  supplementary  benefits  are provided  to those with total incomes
below  the poverty  line.
•  Pension benefits (and lifetime  earnings) are linked to "Swiss" indexation, i.e. the
average of price and wage inflation,  an inventive  compromise  between  full inflation
protection  and full participation  in the fruits  of economic  growth.
*  The public  pension  system  is highly  redistributive.  There are no ceilings  on
contributions,  while  there is a maximum  benefit that amounts  to twice the minimum
pension.  The functioning  of such a pillar depends  on compliance  and a widespread
sense of solidarity  since  the link between contributions  and benefits  is very weak.
*  The first pillar has over the years introduced  significant  benefit  innovations,
although  some  may be more expensive  than others.  The most recent include  bonus
credits  for child rearing  and assisted  living as well as the splitting  of pension  benefits
between spouses.
*  The overall  System  Dependency  ]Ratio  (the number  of beneficiaries  to
contributors)  exceeds  by a large margin  the (Old Age) Demographic  Dependency
Ratio (the number  of old age people to those of economically  active  age). But
4excluding  disability  and survivor  pensions,  the discrepancy  is only about 2 percentage
points.
Financing
*  Despite  the modest  level of benefits,  total annual  expenditure  has been growing.
Old  age and survivor  benefits absorbed  7 per cent of GDP in 1998,  up from 3.3
percent  in 1970.  Disability  pensions  cost an additional  2.1 percent,  for a total cost of
9.1 percent  of GDP, up from a total of 4 percent in 1970.
*  With covered  earnings  amounting  to 60 percent  of GDP, the cost rate  of the first
pillar is about 15.2  percent  of earnings.
*  The contribution  rates levied  on employers  and workers  amount  to 8.4 percent for old
age and survivors  pensions  and 1.4 percent  for disability  pensions.  The total payroll
taxes of 9.8 percent are equally  divided  between  employers  and workers.
*  The low payroll taxes cause fewer distortions in the labor market, but they are
potentially  misleading  because  they overlook  the substantial  subsidies  paid  by
government.
•  Government  co-financing  covers  by design  20 percent  of the cost of old age and
survivor  pensions  and 50 percent  of disability  pensions.  Total  government  co-
financing amounts to 27 percent of benefits. This corresponds to 2.4 percent of
GDP or 4 percent of covered earnings.  Investment income on the reserve fund (0.5
percent of covered earnings) and the  annual deficit (0.9 percent of covered earnings)
make up the difference.
*  The cost of disability insurance in Switzerland - as measured by the total
contribution rate plus government transfers - amounts to a very high 3.5 percent
of covered earnings.  This is expensive by comparison to countries that have
privatized the offer of disability insurance. The high cost probably reflects the greater
maturity of the Swiss system, the older age of Swiss workers, and the use of disability
pensions instead of unemployment benefits. Disability insurance is shared with the
private pillar, which makes even more puzzling its high cost rate.
Future Prospects
*  The Swiss public pillar faces growing financial pressures because of the aging of
the population. But due to its relatively low expenditure and redistributive nature
and the existence of a robust and well funded private pillar, the Swiss pension system
is better prepared to face the challenges of an aging population than most other OECD
countries.
*  Although reliance on government financing was part of the original design of the
public pillar, the growing transfers may generate pressures for significant
changes in the structure of the system.
*  There is a pressing need to address disability insurance, the cost of which
appears to be very high.
5*  There is a gradual trend toward "flat" benefits. Pressure to replace the progressive
formula with some kind of means-tested flat benefits is likely to grow.
1.4  Main Findings: Second Pillar
Coverage
*  Participation is compulsory for all workers in dependent employment whose
annual income exceeds a minimum level. Enrollment starts at age 17 for death and
disability benefits and at age 24 for retirement benefits. Compulsory coverage ends at
termination of employment, at relirement, or when the income of the insured worker
falls below the minimum thresho]ld.
*  Retirement ages are currently set at 65 years for men and 62 years for women. Early
retirement is possible according to the statutes and regulations of the individual
pension funds.
*  Self-employed people, unemployed and disabled workers, and workers on short-term
contracts are not required to participate.
*  The second pillar covers 3.1 million workers. Allowing for some double counting,
only about 74 percent of the labor force is covered., although the proportion of
"eligible" workers that is covered is probably close to 90 percent.
*  The second pillar is based on the concept of "coordinated" earnings. These are
defined as earnings between one and three times the maximum pension from the
public pillar, i.e. between 40 and 1120  percent of average earnings. This is the
minimum definition of "coordinated " earnings. Pension plans may specify a higher
basis, either by using a lower or even no threshold and/or by applying a higher or no
ceiling.
- The use of the concept of "coordinated earnings" allows for an admirable integration
of the two pillars.
*  Uninsured "eligible" workers are covered by the Suppletory Fund. This is
financed by the Guarantee Fund (see below).
Pension Plan Design
*  Second-pillar pension plans must satisfy the minimum legal requirements but
boards of trustees are free to set their terms and conditions, covering such
features as the level and nature of benefits, the rate of contribution, vesting and
portability rights, etc.
*  Boards of trustees are also free in their choice of plan type, i.e. defined-
contribution (DC) or defined-benefit (DB) plans. DC plans provide benefits based on
the contributions made by and on behalf of the individual member with the interest
accrued over the contribution period. DB plans provide retirement benefits, which are
6defined as a percentage of previous earnings, e.g. final pay, final average, or career
average earnings.
*  The minimum conditions specified in the law take the form of defined credits7.
These include minimum age-related credits for contributions as well as minimum
credits for investment income. The law also specifies a minimum annuity
conversion factor. Pension plans are required to maintain notional individual
retirement (aging) accounts and must guarantee an annual nominal rate of
return of 4 percent.
*  The minimum conditions aim to achieve a 30 to 35 percent replacement rate that
together with the public pension would result in an overall replacement rate of 60 to
70 percent for workers with average earnings.
*  The retirement benefits provided by the second pillar depend on the design of
individual pension plans. In general, benefits are paid in the form of pensions. Lump
sums payments are allowed for very low amounts of retirement capital, for the
purchase of housing, when workers become self-employed and when they
permanently leave Switzerland. Lump sum payments may also be authorized,
provided a request is made at least three years before retirement.
*  The law does not specify a uniform or even a minimum contribution rate but'
requires that employer contributions are at least equal to those of employees.
Employer contributions have accounted for 63 percent of total contributions.
*  Insured workers have no choice of fund. They have to join the pension institution
established or selected by their employers. However, when they change employment
they may leave their accumulated capital with the pension fund of the company from
which they are leaving, provided their employer agrees. Workers may thus belong to
several funds, only one of which can be active.
*  The compulsory system also requires the provision of disability and survivors'
pensions. As accumulated balances that have been converted into an annuity are not
inheritable, pensions are also paid to dependent children of retired workers.
T  The benefits of the second pillar are not linked to "Swiss" indexation. Adjustment
to increases in the cost of living is mandatory every 3 years for disability and survivor
pensions. Old age pensions, however, are adjusted at the discretion of the individual
pension funds according to their financial situation.
Regulatory Framework
*  A robust regulatory framework governs the operations of pension funds. This
requires the establishment of pension funds as separate legal entities (most are
established as foundations), independent fund governance based on joint
This  is noted in Smalhout  (1996:244).
7administration with equal representation, asset segregation, internal controls and safe
custody', and appointment of independent auditors and pension experts.
*  No minimum funding requirement is imposed but pension funds must be able to
meet their financial obligations. The law requires that pension fund assets are
managed prudently to ensure the security of assets, achieve a reasonable return on
investments, maintain a suitable diversification of risks, and allow for the liquidity
requirements of the plan.
*  Vesting and portability rules are set by the terms and conditions of pension
plans. However, there are minimum legal requirements that aim to protect the
interests of workers. Since 1995, these also cover super-obligatory benefits.
*  Investment regulations impose quantitative restrictions on the allocation of
assets, but investment policies have also been shaped by valuation and accounting
rules. These various rules have discouraged investments in equities, although
investment policies have become more equity and internationally oriented in recent
years. A very recent change has placed strong emphasis on prudent asset and liability
management and has expanded the scope for investments in private equity and other
assets by funds that demonstrate professional management. Thus, although
quantitative limits are still applied, the "prudent expert" approach seems to be gaining
acceptance.
3  The second pillar pension scheimes  are insured through a government-created
but privately-managed Guarantee Fund. This fund provides subsidies to individual
funds with an unfavorable age structure as well as transfers to compensate for
insolvency of pension funds. The Fund also covers the expenses of the Suppletory
Institution and will support individual funds that face financial difficulties because of
the new stricter rules on vesting and portability.
Institutional Structure
- The second pillar is fragmented. In 1996, it had about 1  1,600 institutions of which
only 4,300 had affiliates. Despite the large number of funds, concentration is high.
100 large funds represent close to 70 percent of affiliates. Nearly 60 percent of funds
with affiliates have less than 100 members each, while 87 percent of funds have less
than 500 members each.
*  80 percent of pension funds wit]h  members, covering 70 percent of affiliates,
operate defined-contribution (DC) plans. 18 percent of pension funds offer
defined-benefit (DB) plans for 29 percent of affiliates. Most DC plans operate in
practice as hybrid plans crediting investment income at 4 percent or higher rate and
placing any excess income in special reserves, but aiming to achieve targeted
replacement rates.
8  The segregation  of assets  and safe  custody  seems  to be based on a simplistic  view that involves
the mere  use of separate  safes for the safekeeping  of securities.
8*  The conversion of DB into DC plans is continuing with the pension fund of the
Federal Government and the Canton and City of Zurich being the latest to announce
their conversion to a DC plan for all new employees.
*  Employers have a number of administrative choices for their company pension
plans: operation as a single-employer entity or participation in multi-employer funds,
which are again subdivided into four types:
*  collective funds, organized by-insurance companies, banks or fiduciary
institutions and offering the benefits of collective administration, while
maintaining separate accounts as well as separate rules and conditions for the
occupational pension schemes of participating employers;
*  professional association funds, open to association members and generally
operating one scheme with similar rules, conditions, and accounts for all
participating employers;
*  multi-employer funds for public sector entities, created for employees of public
sector entities; and
*  conglomerate group funds, set up for the companies of particular groups.
*  Large employers operate self-insured plans, but smaller companies usually
affiliate their employees with insured funds. These are established as collective or
pooled foundations by life insurance companies. They involve the contracting out of
full insurance coverage for old age, disability and survivorship benefits. The
premiums payable to life insurance companies have to be submitted to and  approved
by the Federal Office of Private Insurance. Until 1996, the premium was the same for
all companies and life insurance companies competed only through the level of
dividends and quality of services for their member funds. Today, there is wide range
of fees and conditions from which the funds can choose.
Financial Performance
*  Annual contributions amounted in 1997 to 6.5 percent of GDP or 11 percent of
earnings covered by the first pillar.
*  The number of second pillar beneficiaries rose from 0.22 million in 1970 to 0.67
million in 1997. The ratio of beneficiaries to contributors is 22 percent, while
about 30 percent of old age people receive a second-pillar pension. Annual
benefits amounted to 4.4 percent of GDP in 1997.
*  The total assets of pension funds amnounted  in 1997 to CHF 379 billion or 102 percent
of GDP. This total does not include CHF 85 billion (23 percent of GDP) of pension
fund assets that are managed by insurance companies. Total assets equaled in 1997
CHF 464 billion (125 percent of GDP) 9. Total pension reserves, excluding debt
obligations of pension funds, probably amount to CHF 425 billion.
9  Adding  the other  assets  of insurance  companies  and mutual  funds,  the total assets  of Swiss
institutional  investors  exceed  200 percent  of GDP. Only  3 other  countries  (the  Netherlands,  the United
Kingdom  and the United States)  have achieved  a similar  level of institl!tional  investor  assets.
9*  The funds invested in 1996 21 percent in equities, up from 8 percent in 1987, and
14 percent in real estate. The largest category was represented by debt instruments,
including bonds, loans, mortgages and deposits, at nearly 65 percent of the total, but
down from 75 percent in 1987. Foreign assets accounted for 19 percent of assets.
*  Claims on sponsoring employers, including equity investments and loans,
accounted in 1996 for 12.7 percent of total assets, down from 16.6 percent in 1987
and 33 percent in 1970.
*  There is a large dispersion in agsset  allocation and investment returns between
different types of funds. In 1996, public sector pension funds still invested
31 percent of their assets in loans to employers, down from 60 percent in the mid-
1980s. They probably also invested much less in equities or foreign assets. At the
other end of the spectrum, some large funds invest well over 40 percent in equities
and more than 5 percent in private equity.
*  Investment returns have been ilow.  These are probably the result of conservative
investment policies and asset valuation rules that discourage investments in
equities. There are quantitative limits on equity and foreign investments but these are
not binding in the aggregate. The low real returns on Swiss bonds, which reflect
official policy in favor of low real interest rates, have also been a factor.
- Another reason for the low returns may have been the use of the 4 percent
minimum rate of return as a benchmark by most fund managers.
*  Swiss workers have not voiced much concern about the low returns.  For low-
income workers, this may be because the pension from the private pillar is of
marginal relevance. For middle to high-income workers, it may be because they
participate either in defined-benefit plans or in defined-contribution plans that receive
high contributions from employers.
*  Returns have risen recently because of changes in asset allocation and improved
performance of both Swiss equities and bonds. Some large pension funds report
returns that are similar to those achieved by large funds in Anglo-American
countries.
*  Reported  operating  costs at less than 7 percent  of contributions  or 0.5 percent  of
assets are low, but they may understate  the true level of costs as various  costs are
absorbed  by sponsoring  employers.
Supervision
*  Supervision is fragmented and iinstitutionally  weak, although professional auditors
and pension experts are required to report to the regulators any infractions of rules.
*  Information disclosure is poor and lack of transparency is a problem.  It may
have contributed to the lack of concern about investment returns.
*  The Guarantee Fund has been faced with increasing outlays because of fund
insolvencies. The vast majority of these cases were due to bankruptcy of the
sponsoring company and not a consequence of bad fund management. (Nussbaum
101999)  The fee to the Guarantee  Fund  has been  raised  from 0.04 percent  in 1990  to 0.1
percent in 1998.
Future  Prospects
*  The large number of small institutions makes supervision and transparency
difficult without offering any real benefits to workers. This is one of the major
weaknesses of employer-based schemes, that is made worse by the captivity of
workers, who do not have the right to switch funds (except when they change
employers) and can exert little direct influence on the efficiency and performance of
the funds. A consolidation trend may be set in train.
*  Another major weakness is the use of a uniform type of annuity. This is shared by
most public and private compulsory pillars. It forces all retiring workers to purchase
the same type of annuity, irrespective of their individual circumstances and needs.
Demand  for greater  choice  may increase.
*  There is growing pressure for the achievement of higher returns and for giving
employees greater choice in selecting pension funds and directing their
investments. Many large funds are considering the pros and cons of adopting more
flexible  structures.
*  Investment regulations are likely to be substantially relaxed with a more general
move toward adoption of the "prudent expert" rule. Over the years the pension
funds have moved  gradually  away  from claims  on employers  (effectively  book
reserves)  and domestic  bonds  in favor of equities  and foreign  securities.
1.5  Main Findings: Third Pillar
*  The third pillar is based on voluntary savings and plays a small part in the pension
system.
- It consists of two parts: the "tied individual retirement savings", which benefit
from tax incentives; and other personal savings in the form of life insurance,
investments, bank accounts, or property ownership.
*  Tax incentives are provided to self-employed workers and to workers covered by
occupational plans, though the limits for the self-employed are much higher.
*  Tied individual retirement savings are subject to regulatory constraints. They are
operated by insurance companies and specially authorized banking foundations.
1.6  Overall Assessment
A distinguishing feature of the Swiss pension system is the excellent design of
the unfunded public pillar. Its many positive features are not due to some grand original
design but are the result of the periodic revisions that have addressed emerging issues.
11Since its introduction, the first pillar has gone through 10 revisions as well as some minor
modifications.
*  Public pensions are modest and aim at an average replacement rate of
30% to 35% of average earnings.  As a result, payroll taxes, which are
shared equally between eimployers  and employees, are also modest. Payroll
taxes have also been kept low because the federal and cantonal governments
contribute by design 20%,  of pension payments.
*  The maximum public pension is limited to twice the minimum.  While
pensions are subject to ceilings, contributions to the public pillar are not.  The
system achieves high (intragenerational) redistribution, especially among
people of similar marital status, with considerably higher replacement rates for
low-income workers and lower ones for high-income earners. Public pensions
are based on both earnings and years of contributions and use indexed
(actualized) career earnings as a basis for determining initial pensions.
3  Both lifetime earnings and pensions in payment are indexed to the
average of wage and price inflation (so-called Swiss indexation).  Finally,
the tax treatment of the first pillar is EET (the same as for the second and third
pillars)."'
The unique features of the second pillar in Switzerland are:
o  It is a compulsory occupational pillar that is extensively funded and
privately managed.
o  It is effectively a defined-credit system. The law specifies the minimum
credits that must be made ito  individual "notional" or "shadow" accounts'". It
also specifies the minimum interest that must be credited to these accounts
and the annuity conversion factor that must be used on retirement. Most
occupational pension plans effectively operate with targeted benefit levels
and many plans continue to offer additional "super-obligatory" benefits.
*  The defined credits are related to the age of worker. The notional
contribution rates increase with age, so a higher contribution rate is paid or
'°  An EET regime  involves  Exemption  of contributions,  Exemption  of investment  income,  and
Taxation  of benefits.
I  I  Thus,  the use of "notional"  individual  accounts  in the Swiss  second  pillar predates  the
development  of "notional"  accounts  in Sweden.  Moreover,  the Swiss  combine  "notional"  accounts  with
funding,  while the Swedish  approach,  which  has also been  copied in Italy, Latvia  and Poland,  is applied in
an unfunded  plan.
12imputed  at a time of life when it is more affordable  for most workers.  At the
same  time, it increases  the cost of employing  older workers  for companies.
Low-income  earners  are not obliged  to participate  in the second  pillar but
employers  may  voluntarily  enroll them in their pension  plans.
The Swiss system  exhibits  an admirable  coordination  and integration
between  the two pillars  and  with social assistance  (supplementary)  pensions. While
all employees  are required  to contribute  without  ceiling  to the first pillar,  contributions  to
the second  pillar are exempt on all earnings  below a limit  that is specified  annually  and
corresponds  to about 40% of average  earnings. In this way, low-income  workers  are not
forced  to "oversave"  and retire  with very high replacement  rates" 2.
In addition,  workers  below  the age of 24 are not required  to contribute  to the
second  pillar,  although  all employees  have  to participate  in disability  insurance. Self-
employed  people  are not required  to contribute  to the second  pillar, but they are given tax
incentives  to save in voluntary  retirement  savings  plans. Compulsory  contributions  to
the second  pillar are based on the concept  of "coordinated  earnings"  (those  between
roughly  40 and 120  percent of average  earnings)  and aim at achieving  a 60 to 70 percent
overall  replacement  rate for most workers.  Compulsory  second  pillar  contributions  are
thus subject  to a ceiling  that is equal to about 120  percent of average  earnings. However,
additional  voluntary  contributions  are allowed  and benefit fully  from the same  tax
advantages  as the compulsory  contributions.' 3
Another  aspect  of pillar integration  is the sharing  of responsibility  for
disability  pensions  between  the public  and private  pillars.  In most other  countries,
disability  pensions  are the responsibility  of either  the private  or the public  pillar.  Total
disability  pensions  from the public and private  pillars are limited  to 90 percent of
previous  annual  earmings.
Integration  of both pillars  with the payment  of supplementary  pensions  to
people with  inadequate  means  is also important. Old  people  with incomes  below  the
poverty  line receive  a supplement  from the state. It is interesting  to note  that the public
pension  paid to most people  is below  the official  poverty line. However,  most workers
also receive  a private pension  and/or  have other financial  means in old age.
Despite  the integration  of the two pillars  and the modest  level of public
pensions,  the total cost rate of the two pillars  is not low. As already  noted above,
12  As argued  in Vittas  (1997:34)  this feature  is absent  in the new Argentine  pension  system.  It is also
absent  from the new pension  systems  that  were recently introduced  in Hungary  and  Poland.
13  Recently,  a proposal  has been  put forward  to place an upper limit  on the tax-exempt  voluntary
contributions  to the second  pillar, but no such limit  has been imposed  so far. Under  this proposal,
contributions  to the second  pillar would  be tax exempt  up to an annual  salary of CHF  300,000.
13public pensions absorb 9.1 percent of GDP, while second pillar benefits amount to
4.4 percent of GDP, resulting in a combined total of 13.5 percent of GDP. As covered
earnings amount to 60 percent of GDP, this corresponds to a cost rate of 22.5 percent of
covered earnings. The total financing rate, which also includes the reserves set aside in
the funded pillar, amounts to 15.6 percent of GDP or 26 percent of the covered earnings.
In the funded pillar, investrnent income noW  represents the dominant component behind
the vast accumulation of pension assets.
The discussion has so far focused on the main strengths of the Swiss pension
system.  But as already noted the system also suffers from some important
weaknesses. For the public pillar, one problem is the gradually deteriorating system
dependency ratio. This is due to demographic aging, resulting from declining fertility
and increasing longevity" 4. But it is also caused by the  high and increasing number of
disability pensioners.. Disability insurance is particularly expensive with a 3.5 percent
total cost rate.
A second problem concerns the unequal treatment of single and married
workers as well as the unequal treatment of working wives, although this has been
addressed recently.  Connected with this is the use of a single annuity product (ioint
and contingent survivor life annuity) that tends to penalize workers who belong to groups
with shorter average life expectancies.
The main weaknesses of the second pillar relate to its lack of transparency,
the generally low investment returns, and the use of standardized annuity products.
Consistent, timely and reliable data on the size and structure of private pension funds, the
asset composition of their portfolios, and their performance in terms of investment returns
and operating costs are conspicuous by their absence. Several regulations and
valuation rules constrain investment choice. Together with the imposition of a low
minimum nominal rate of return, they probably explain the low investment returns.
The conservative investment policies pursued by most pension funds also were a
contributory factor. Although individual funds may apply for an exemption from binding
investment rules, most fund managers preferred to adopt conservative policies and
operate within the prescribed limits. They also tended to adopt conservative accounting
and valuation policies, using the lower of cost or market values rather than "mark-to-
market" policies.
Rather surprisingly, workers and the public at large seem in general to be
unconcerned about the low returns. Various explanations can be offered for this. First,
workers covered by large company plans may belong to defined-benefit plans, where the
performance risk is assumed by employers. Second, because of the use of the concept of
"coordinated earnings", low-income workers may rely only to a limited extent (or not at
all if their income is below the stipulated threshold) on their private pension for their old
14  This is a weakness that will also affect the funded pillar.
14age. They are thus little affected by low returns. Moreover, such workers probably benefit
from the redistributive effects of the public pillar and have little reason to be critical of
the overall system. Third, middle and high-income workers participating in defined-
contribution plans may be insulated from the effects of low investment returns by the
effective operation of such funds as hybrid funds with targeted replacement rates and high
employer contributions. Fourth, the impact of low investment returns may be
substantially mitigated, if not offset, by the stipulation of a rather generous annuity
conversion factor.
The special provisions and transfers in favor of the "transition generation"
may also have mitigated any adverse criticism of the pension system. Few retiring
workers have suffered so far from the poor investment returns, although continuation of
these patterns may have an adverse impact on future retirees.
The only strong criticisms of the Swiss pension system have related to vesting
and portability rules and the unequal treatment of working wives and single
persons. Both of these issues have been addressed in recent years.
1.7  Future Prospects
The Swiss public pillar faces growing financial pressures because of the aging
of the population. Serious consideration is already being given to raising the normal
retirement age to 67 or more. As in all other countries, this is likely to face strong
political opposition. To overcome these political problems, Swiss experts are
contemplating linking in a more automatic but practical way the normal retirement
age to life expectancy at retirement. Another possibility is to insulate financially the
public pillar from retirement decisions of individual workers by an appropriate
redefinition of the actuarial decrements (in cases of early retirement) and increments (in
case of late retirement). Current plans envisage lower actuarial reductions for workers
with low benefits. Since retirees on low pensions are entitled to supplementary benefits,
this could effectively mean that this group could retire at a lower age with the same
benefits. These plans should be evaluated carefully.
Other options include raising the contribution rate or using earmarked taxes,
such as a percentage of VAT, a special tax on energy, a wealth tax, or inheritance tax, to
increase the revenues of the public pillar.' 5 Raising the contribution rate will increase
payroll taxes with adverse effects on labor market incentives, while using earmarked
taxes will increase further the already high reliance on government co-financing.
1  5  The value-added  tax was increased  by 1 percentage  point in 1999  and the additional  revenues  are
channeled  to the first  pillar.  Further  scheduled  increases  are envisaged  in  the on-going  revision  of the law.
Also,  part of the revenues  from  recent  sales of gold  reserves  were allocated  to the public  pension  system.
15Another  alternative  is to consider  more  fundamental  changes  in the structure
of benefits.  The use of means-tested  supplementary  benefits  and the recent  introduction
of a progressive  benefit formula  suggest  that the first pillar  has been  moving  slowly  but
steadily  in the direction  of "flat" benefits.  It is unlikely,  however,  that a drastic  change
would  happen  in the foreseeable  future. A more  pressing  issue is to address  the very
high  cost of disability  pensions.
As regards the second  pillar,  the main issues are to improve  its transparency
and supervision,  which implies  an encouragement  of consolidation  in the sector, and to
enhance  its investment  performance.  There seems to be growing  pressure  for the
further  relaxation  of investment  rules and for giving employees  greater  choice in selecting
pension  funds  and directing  their investments.  Many large funds are considering  the pros
and cons  of adopting  more  flexible  structures.
Given its record  of innovation,  Switzerland  could be the first country  to
contemplate  seriously  the creation  of a dual regulatory  structure,  comprising  a
heavily  regulated  part with strong  government  guarantees  that caters for those with low
risk tolerance  and a more liberal  part with strong  conduct  rules but fewer  state guarantees
for those seeking  a higher return.
Another  major  issue is the development  of a more  sophisticated  market  for
annuities.  The current  compulsory  annuitization  on the basis of a uniform  type of annuity
may need to be replaced  by a more  flexible system.  In this, compulsory  annuitization
with a standard  annuity  product  could be limited  to a reasonable  overall  replacement  rate,
while additional  balances  could be linkled  either  to variable  annuities  or to scheduled
withdrawals.
In view of the relatively  low expenditure  and redistributive  nature  of the first
pillar  and the long  presence  of a robust  and well funded second  pillar, the Swiss  pension
system  is better  prepared  to face  the challenges  of an aging population  as well as
changing  financial  technology  than most other  OECD  countries.
16II.  The First Pillar
2.1  Introduction
How did the Swiss authorities  design  a near-perfect  public  pillar? And  what are
the main features  of the public  pillar  that  justify this characterization?  The design  of the
public  pillar  as it stands  today  reflects  the various  revisions  that have  been implemented
over the years.  Many of the current  features  were not present  when the public  pillar  was
first introduced  in 1948.
Design  improvements  have  been a collective  response  to the various  problems
facing  the public  pillar.  Because  major  revisions  are submitted  to a public  referendum  for
approval,  the package  of new measures  needs  to be balanced.  This provides  a strong
incentive  for sensible  policies,  while the public  is able  to vote on the whole  package  and
is often forced  to accept  or reject  "the bitter  with the sweet".  For example,  the 1  0t
revision  that  was enacted  in 1997 combined  compulsory  contributions  for non-working
wives  and widows  and a gradual  increase  in the retirement  age of women  with splitting
pension  rights  between  men and women  (and thus protecting  divorced  women)  and
introducing  credits  for child  rearing  and home care.
The main features  of the first pillar  include  the following:
*  near universal coverage
- nmodest  benefits with low dispersion
--  a manipulation-resistantprogressive  benefitformula
- reasonable normal retirement ages and discouragement of early retirement
- somewhat "lax" disability pensions
- "means-tested"  supplementary benefits
*  "Swiss"  indexation of both benefits and earnings
*  no contribution ceilings and consistent tax treatment
*  considerable redistribution
*  significant benefit innovations
*  sustainable but rising system dependency ratios
*  low contribution rates
*  government co-financing
*  low administration costs
*  sound but weakening finances
172.2  Coverage
Near universal coverage. After the 1  O' revision in 1997, all residents in
Switzerland, including non-working wives, students, people receiving public transfers
(such as unemployed  and disabled  workers),  the self-employed,  and family  workers  paid
in kind,  are compelled  to be insured and  contribute  to the public  pillar. Before  the 10th
revision,  non-working  wives and widows  as well  as non-income  earning  family  workers
were not required  to contribute,  although  they  were allowed  to make contributions  based
on wealth  since 1973.
The first pillar has achieved  high coverage  since 1950  when it counted  2.16
million  contributors,  representing  82 percent  of the economically  active  population.  In
1998,  coverage  reached  3.8 million  people  or 89 percent of the economically  active
population  (Table  1)16.
2.3  Benefits
Modest benefits with low dispersion. The maximum pension from the public
pillar is twice the minimum pension. These levels are set annually and correspond to
about 20.3 and 40.6 percent of average earnings' 7. This feature was introduced in 1969 as
part of the 7'  revision of the system. The ratio of maximum to minimum pensions
amounted to 3.1 in 1948 when the first pillar was introduced. The compression of the
max/min ratio was motivated by the need to expand minimum benefits in the 1970s while
keeping contribution rates low and avoiding a crowding out of the (then voluntary)
private pillar. It is important to note that these measures were taken at a time when most
neighboring European countries were expanding the benefits of their social security
systems and in so doing were undermining the prospects of private pillars and
occupational pensions.
Pension benefits vary by the marital status of pensioners.  Pensions for married
couples are equal to 150 percent of the pensions for single persons. The corresponding
proportions for other categories of beneficiaries are 80 percent for widows, and
40 percent for orphans. Pensioners with wives aged between 55 and 62 received a
30 percent supplementary pension. However, the IOth revision eliminated this
supplement for persons retiring after 1997. The 10th revision also replaced the pensions
for couples with individual pensions. But a limit of 150 percent on the level of the
combined individual pensions continues to apply to married couples.
16  Table I also reports  coverage  in relation  to the labor force, although  some members  of the labor
force  are not required  to contribute,  while some contributors  do not belong  to the labor  force.
17  For 1999,  they are respectively  equal  to CHF 12,060  and 24,120. These correspond  to about 20.3
and 40.6 percent  of the average  covered  wage,  which  amounted  in 1998  to CHF 59,400.
18The average old age pension benefit amounted to CHF 1,657 for single recipients
in 1998 (equivalent to 33 percent of the average covered wage). Allowing for
supplementary benefits (see below), the average pension increases to CHF 1,842 (or
37 percent of the average wage).
A manipulation-resistant  progressive benefit  formula. Many countries,
especially in the developing world, have public pension systems that provide unintended
incentives for evasion and for understatement of income for most of working life with
overstatement of income during the last few years before retirement. This is the case
when pension benefits depend on average earnings over the last three to five years before
retirement and on fulfillment of a minimum contribution period. A short minimum
contribution period encourages evasion by young low-income workers (especially when a
minimum pension is offered), while a long minimum contribution period encourages
evasion by both young and old workers.
In Switzerland, public pensions consist of two parts. One is based on years of
contributions and the other on average lifetime earnings. Persons who have complete
contribution records are entitled to a full pension, while incomplete contribution periods
give rise to partial pensions. The proportionality rule was introduced in 1960. But since
practically the entire population is compulsorily insured, incomplete contribution careers
are not very common, except for persons who have spent long periods abroad. It is
estimated that over 90 percent of all single old age pensioners receive pensions based on
a full contribution period.
Prior to 1993, the benefit formula was the same for all workers.  It provided
80 percent of the minimum pension (pro-rated by years of contributions) and 20 percent
of pensionable salary, subject to the maximum pension ceiling. Under this formula, the
replacement rate would amount to 100 percent for a worker earning 20 percent of the
average, 36 percent for a worker at average earnings, and 8 percent for a worker earning
five times the average. A two-step pension benefit formula was introduced in 1993". This
aimed to increase the public pensions of workers with below average earnings and thus
reduce the number of pensioners that rely on means-tested supplementary benefits
(Table 2).
Reasonable normal retirement ages and discouragement of early retirement.
Many countries have public pension systems with low retirement ages and lax conditions
for early retirement. These features cause a disproportionate increase in the number of
18  For pensionable  incomes  up to 3 times  the minimum  pension,  the fLxed  component  is equal  to 74
percent  of the minimum  pension  and the variable  component  is calculated  as 26 percent  of pensionable
earnings. For workers  earning  above  this limit,  the fixed  pension  component  is 104  percent  of the
minimum  pension,  while  the variable  component  is calculated  as 16  percent  of the applicable  income.  With
this formula,  those  earning  less  than average  earnings  receive  a higher  replacement  rate by a few
percentage  points,  while  those  with above  average  earnings  continue  to receive  low  replacement  rates. The
replacement  rate for a worker  with  half the average  earnings  would  increase  from 52 to 56  per cent.
19beneficiaries  and result in unsustainably  high system dependency  ratios. In Switzerland
the normal  retirement  age is 65 for men and 62 for women.  After  the 10 revision  in
1997,  the retirement  age for women is scheduled  to increase  gradually  to 63 by 2001 and
64 by 2005.
Until  the 10' revision,  there were few opportunities  for early retirement,  while
deferred  pensions,  introduced  in 1969,  were allowed  for up to five years,  with
corresponding  increases  in pension  benefits.  Early retirement  will now be permitted  but
the public  pension  will be reduced  by 6.8 percent for every  year  of early retirement' 9.
Somewhat "lax" disability  pensions. Introduced  in 1960,  disability  insurance  is
compulsory  for all affiliates  of the old age and survivors  pension  scheme.  Responsibility
for disability  pensions  is shared  with the private pillar.  The primary  objective  is to
provide  vocational  rehabilitation  and labor force reintegration  rather than to pay disability
pensions.  However,  in the early and imid-1990s,  disability  pensions  were used as a less
socially  divisive  way of coping  with the unemployment  of older  workers  in declining
industries.
Beneficiaries  of disability  pensions  and other  monetary  benefits  must pay
contributions  to OASI  and unemployment  insurance. If they  are employed,  contributions
are calculated  according  to income,  but if they have no other  income,  contributions  are
calculated  on the basis of wealth  or irnputed  wealth.  Disability  pensions  are paid only
until the beneficiary  reaches  the regular  retirement  age of 65 years for men and 62 years
for women. Thereafter,  regular  old age pensions  are paid. The average  single  person
disability  pension  amounted  to CHF 1,298  per month in 1998,  corresponding  to
78 percent of the average  old age pension.
"Means-tested"supplementary  benefis.  The minimum  pension  of the first  pillar
is supplemented  by means-tested,  non-contributory  benefits  that were introduced  in 1964.
The supplementary  benefits  evolved  from cantonal  welfare  programs  supported  by fiscal
subsidies,  which  were the only public  income support  for the aged  before  the
establishment  of the OASI insurance.  When  the first pillar  was introduced,  the cantons
received  the reserves  of these  programs  to continue  providing  benefits on a discretionary
basis. But a large  number  of the old age and, especially,  disability  pensioners  were found
to lack adequate  protection. Supplementary  benefits  were preferred  to the alternative  of
raising  the minimum  pension  to the subsistence  level, which  would  have been  too costly.
Supplementary  benefits  are targeted  at old age and disability  pensioners  who have
to rely exclusively  on the first pillar for their old age income.  They are calculated  to reach
a minimum  1999  income  of CHF 16,460  for single persons  (136 percent of the minimum
pension)  and CHF 24,690  for couples.  In 1998,  about 64 thousand  old-age  pensioners
19  During  the  transitory  period  of  raising  the  normal  retirement  age  for  women,  the  actuarial
reduction  will amount  to 3.4  percent.
20received  a supplementary  pension  amounting  on average  to CHF 543  per month  or CHF
6,516 per year. This corresponds  to 11 per cent of the average  covered  wage. Receipt  of a
supplementary  pension  would  raise  the total pension  income  of persons  at the minimum
pension  level to 31 percent  of the average  covered  wage.  Supplementary  pensions  were
also paid to 134  thousand  recipients  of disability  pensions  at an average  benefit  of CHF
440 per month.
The supplementary  benefits  are financed  predominantly  by the cantons  with
subsidies  from the Confederation  ranging  between 10 and 35 percent of expenditure.
During  recent  years,  the share  of pensioners  eligible  for these  benefits  has been rising  for
various reasons:  minimum  pensions  were usually  raised  less than the subsistence  income
limit, and more pensioners  required  financial  support  to cover  the costs of long-term  care.
"Swiss" indexation of benefits and earnings.  Indexation  of pensions  was
introduced  in 1979. In earlier  years, adjustments  were made on ad hoc basis. Major
increases  in pension  benefits  were authorized  in the 1970s  to protect  pensioners  from the
high rates of inflation  of that decade. After 1979  both new pensions  and current  pensions
are calculated  by applying  the mixed  Swiss pension  index. This composite  index is
defined  as the average  of the national  consumer  price and the BIGA  wage index. The
index is cumulative  based  on 1979,  the year  of its introduction. Adjustments  are made
every  two years,  unless prices  rise by more  than 4 percent in any one year, in which case
pensions  are adjusted  annually. The Swiss  pension  index is also used for revaluing
lifetime  earnings.
No contribution ceilings and consistent tax treatment. Both employer  and
employee  contributions  are tax-exempt  and are levied  on total income  without  ceiling  for
all income-earning  contributors.  Switzerland  is one of few  countries,  if not the only one,
that imposes  no ceilings  on the salaries  that are subject  to contributions  to the public
pillar and also applies  the same  tax treatment  on contributions  to the first and second
pillar.  The absence  of a ceiling  increases  the redistributive  impact  of the first pillar.
Considerable redistribution.  Since  the first pillar  provides  pensions  within
minimum  and maximum  limits,  the replacement  rate declines  from more than 100  percent
for very low-income  earners  toward  0 percent for very high-income  earners. In 1992,
31 percent  of all single old age pensioners  received  the maximum  pension,  while 7
percent  received  the minimum  pension  (Table  7). 93 percent  of single old age pensions
paid were full pensions,  i.e. based on a full contribution  record.  The average  replacement
rate for full single  old age pensions  was around 30 percent of previous  earnings.
Redistribution  is increased  by the payment  of supplementary  benefits.  Because  no ceiling
is applied  on the level of income  that is used as a base for calculating  contributions,  the
extent  of redistribution  is greater  than in the United States  and most other  countries  that
normally  impose  such a ceiling.  In fact,  the contribution  on incomes  above a certain
threshold  level is often  described  as a "solidarity  contribution"  (Helbling  1991:448).
21Nevertheless, as in other OECD countries with similar schemes, redistribution
often takes place in unintended directions. There is extensive redistribution from single to
married affiliates, because of the 50 percent supplement for marital pensions, and from
men to women, because of the lower retirement age and longer life expectancy of women.
This often works in perverse ways in the sense that lower-income single men may
"support" higher-income married women. However, because of the low maximum limit
on public pensions, such perverse redistribution is likely to be smaller than in other
countries. Moreover, changes in rules regarding contributions and benefits in the 1990s
(such as the compulsory contribution by non-working spouses and the more progressive
benefit formula) are likely to increase redistribution from high to low-income workers for
particular groups of participants and to reduce (though not eliminate) perverse
redistribution across different groups.
Significant  benefit innovations.  The Swiss first pillar has an impressive record of
innovation. Benefit innovations cover the adoption of the proportionality rule in 1960, the
low dispersion rule in 1969 and the "Swiss" indexation of benefits in 1979. Two new
features that are part of the 10th revision include the offer of bonus credits for child
rearing and assisted living (home care) and the splitting of pension benefits between
spouses.
Bonus credits will be granted for raising (educating) children and for assisting old
and disabled persons.  The educational credits will take the form of "notional" salaries
added to the earnings of the beneficiaries for all the years during which a family has
children aged less than 16, thus increasing the pensionable salary that is used for
determining the pension.  A family having 3 children at 2-year intervals will receive this
"notional" salary for a total of 20 years. The "notional" salary will be equal to 3 times the
minimum pension.  A similar bonus wvill  also be credited for assisted living, although
only one bonus per year can be credited.
The educational and assisted living bonuses will be divided between the two
spouses or will be credited to the single person who raises the children or looks after a
person needing assistance.  These provisions are likely to benefit low and middle-income
people, since the total pension is still subject to the maximum level set each year. But
they will also increase the total cost of the system at a time when there are growing
concerns about the deteriorating system dependency ratio.
The other major innovation of the 10th revision is the splitting of pensions
between spouses.  This will apply in the case where both spouses are retired for all
pensions obtained after 1997. The spouses will share equally all income earned during
the marriage, but will be entitled to their own personal incomes earned before the
marriage or after the marriage in cases of divorce.  Splitting will also apply in the case of
divorce as well as when survivor pensions are set.
Sustainable but rising system dependency  ratios.  A feature of most public
pension systems is that the system dependency ratio tends to exceed the (old age)
22demographic dependency ratio, especially in mature systems. This is usually because the
number of beneficiaries increases faster than the number of contributors, while growing
evasion may also contribute to the discrepancy. In Switzerland, evasion is non-existent
or, at best, negligible. Any discrepancy would originate in a disproportionate increase in
the number of beneficiaries.
The number of people receiving an old age, survivor or disability pension
increased steadily over the years, from 0.3 million in 1950 to 1.8 million in 1998
(Table 3). This exceeded by as much as 50 percent the number of people aged over the
normal retirement age. To a significant extent this is explained by the fact that all the
reported survivor pensions, which represent 7 percent of the total, and disability pensions,
which account for an additional 12 percent, are paid to people of a younger age. As noted
above, all these benefits convert into old age pensions on reaching normal retirement age.
But even the number of old age pensions, which amounted to 1.45 million in
1998, is higher than the number of old people. This discrepancy is probably explained by
the counting of pensions for married couples as two individual pensions. As a high
proportion of spousal beneficiaries is likely to be below the normal retirement age, the
number of old age pension recipients exceeds the total number of people above the
normal retirement age. Counting pensions paid to couples as one reduces the number of
old age pensions to 1.15 million, which corresponds to 94 percent of old people.
Indirect evidence on the impact of below retirement age pensions is provided by
labor market statistics. Data for 1998 show that 97 percent of men and 79 percent of
women between the ages of 25 and 54 participated in the labor force. These proportions
fell to 82 and 64 percent for people aged between 55 and 64/61 years respectively, while
for people above the normal retirement age, the labor force participation rate (LFPR) was
much lower at 13 and 9 percent. The data also show a contrasting trend in the
employment pattern of men and women over the 1990s. While the LBFR of men aged
between 55 and 64 fell from 86 percent in 1991 to 82 percent in 1998, that of women
aged between 55 and 61 rose from 53 to 64 percent.
During the early and mid-1990s, disability pensions were used as a less socially
divisive way of dealing with the unemployment of older workers in declining traditional
industries (such as textiles, watches, and precision instruments). The number of disability
pensioners increased by 37 percent between 1990 and 1998, while that of recipients of the
old age pension benefit rose by only 18 percent. Although the growing use of disability
pensions weakens the finances of the pension system, the financial cost would not be
much smaller from an overall public perspective if unemployment benefit were to be
paid. Exiting the labor market on vague disability grounds would be less distressing than
being made redundant, although special care is always required to discourage abuse and
to prevent employable workers from taking the easy way out 20.
20  Swiss  pension  officials  and experts  argue that  the rise of disability  pensions  is not due to their
misuse  but rather  to the easing  of labor  market  conditions  in the 1990s.  The argument  is that during  very
23The system  dependency  ratio, which shows  the number  of beneficiaries  as a
percentage  of contributors  and includes all types of beneficiaries  (old age, survivor  and
disability  pensions)" 1, amounted  to 47 percent in 1998  up from 14 percent  in 1950  and
39 percent in 1980  (Table  4). The (old age) demographic  dependency  ratio, which  shows
the number  of old age people  as a percentage  of people  of "economically  active" age,
stood at 28 percent in 1998,  having  increased  from 23 percent  in 1950.
The difference  of 19  percentage  points is quite large. Excluding  disability  and
survivor  pensions,  which  together  accounted  for 19 percent  of all pension  benefits,  the
system  dependency  ratio for old age pensions  falls to 38 percent,  i.e. 10 percentage  points
higher than the (old age) demographic  dependency  ratio. Counting  couples  as one benefit
recipient  would  reduce  the number  of old age pension  benefits  to 1.15  million  and the
SDR to 30 percent.
2.4  Financing
Low contribution rates. Contribution rates are low because the public pillar offers
modest  benefits,  operates  on an unfunded  basis with a targeted  one-year  liquidity  reserve,
and enjoys  considerable  government  co-financing.  Contribution  rates were initially  set at
4 percent, but after successive increases in the 1  960s and 1  970s they have amounted since
1975 to 8.4 percent, divided equally between employers and workers (Table 5). Self-
employed persons contribute betweein  4.2 percent and 7.8 percent depending on their
level of income, which is established in accordance with the income assessed for tax
purposes.  Non-working  persons  contribute  according  to their personal  assets,  including
the imputed wealth from the receipt of annuity income, but their contributions are subject
to an upper limit.  In 1999, the minimum annual contribution  of non-working  persons
amounted to CHF 324 and the maximum to CHF 8,400. This maximum has also
remained constant since 1975.
Contributions are payable by all employees aged 17 years and older, while non-
employed persons must start contributing at age 20.  If employment continues beyond the
retirement ages of 62 years for women and 65 years for men, contributions are payable
only for monthly incomes above a specified limit. (The obligation to contribute above
retirement age was abolished shortly after the introduction of the first pillar but was
reinstated a few years ago.) The exempt limit for working pensioners amounts to CHF
1,400 per month.
tight labor  markets  many older  and weaker  workers  participate  in the labor  force and thus the number  of
disability  pensioners  is kept below  its normal  level. When labor  market  conditions  ease, most of these
workers  exit  the labor force  by taking  disability  pensions  and  this explains  the large rise in their number  in
the 1990s.  No hard  evidence  is provided  to support  this widely-held  thesis.
21  Supplementary  pensions  are not included  in this total  to avoid  double  counting.
24Disability  insurance  is financed  in equal shares  by payroll  taxes and by
government  contributions. Payroll  taxes are shared  equally  between  employers  and
employees. They amount  to a total of 1.4 percent  of income. The self-employed  pay the
same  rate, while non-working  people  pay between  CHF 54 and 1400. The payroll  tax for
disability  insurance  was initially  set at 0.4 percent. After several  small  increases  in the
late 1960s  and early 1970s,  it reached  1 percent  in 1975. It was raised  to 1.2 percent in
1988  and has been at its current  level since 1995  (Table 6).
Revenues  from contributions  and a small amount  of investment  income  cover
approximately  50 percent of total expenditure  on disability  pensions. The other half is
funded  by the federal  government  (37.5  percent)  and the cantons  (12.5  percent). In the
past few years government  contributions  accounted  for an increasing  share  of total
revenues,  reaching  nearly  55 percent  of the total in 1998.  Contributions  to disability
insurance  are collected  and administered  by the old age and survivors  insurance  funds.
At a total contribution  rate of 3.1 percent,  disability  insurance  is expensive  by
comparison  to rates  charged  by private  insurance  companies  in Chile  and Argentina.
Adding  the existing  deficit,  the cost rate  rises to 3.5 percent of covered  earnings.  The cost
of public  disability  insurance  looks particularly  high if account  is also  taken of the
disability  insurance  offered  by the private pillar and of the fact  that disability  pensions  are
not paid for life but only up to the normal  retirement  age, when  they convert  into old age
pensions.  The higher cost may be explained  by the greater  maturity  of the Swiss pension
system,  the older age of Swiss workers,  the redistributive  component  of the public  pillar,
and perhaps  also the use of more lax conditions  for granting  disability  pensions.
Government  co-financing.  The first pillar operates on a pay-as-you-go basis with
government  co-financing. It aims  to have a liquidity  fund covering  one year's spending.
It is financed  from employer  and employee  contributions,  from the investment  income
earned  on the liquidity  reserves,  and from federal and cantonal  transfers. The latter  cover
respectively  17 and 3 percent of annual  expenditures  for old age and survivor  pensions,
although  the share  of the federal  government  has fluctuated  over the years 22. Allowing  for
the government  transfers,  the total contribution  rate for the old age and survivor  pension
scheme  amounts  to 10.7  percent. This is low by the standards  of most European
countries  and is explained  by the more modest  level of public  pensions.  If one abstracts
from  the surplus  that is being accumulated  in the US social  security  system  to cover the
future retirement  needs of the baby boom generation,  the Swiss and US contribution  rates
are comparable.
22  The federal  subsidy  was substantially  reduced  in the 1970s  when  the federal  govermment  was
facing  strong  budgetary  pressures,  but was restored in the 1990s.
25Government also pays half the cost of disability pensions. This amounts to
1.7 percent of covered earnings. The total government contribution for old age, survivor,
and disability pensions is equivalent to 4.1 percent of covered earnings.
Low administration costs. The public pension pillar is organized and
administered on a decentralized structure. A total of 105 funds with about 3,000 branch
offices throughout the country register the insured, collect contributions, administer
accounts, and pay benefits.  Of these, 77 are run by professional associations, 26 by the
cantons, and 2 by the federal government. A clearing and equalization office under the
federal government keeps a central register of all insured persons and manages the central
reserve fund. The clearing office balances income and expenditure flows among the
individual funds and invests the surplus reserve.
The administration costs of the first pillar amounted to less than 1 percent of total
benefits for old age, survivor and disability pensions in 1998. The old age and survivors
scheme had expenses of less than 0.4 percent of total benefits. But administrative costs
were much higher in the case of disability pensions at nearly 3 percent of benefits.  The
costs involved in assessing the individual degree of disability and administering the
different types of disability and rehabilitation benefits are clearly higher than those for
old age and survivor pensions.
The administrative costs of social insurance are financed through fees payable by
contributing employers, the self-employed and non-working contributors. The cantonal
pension funds charged an average fee of 1.78 percent of contributions, the funds of
professional associations charged on average 0.81 percent. The cantonal funds also
receive transfers from the social insurance central fund to cover additional administrative
tasks.
Sound but weakeningfinances.  Revenues of the old age and survivors scheme
increased from 3.3 percent of GDP in 1950 to 6.6 percent in 1998, when they amounted
to CHF 25.3 billion (Table 8). Revenues evolved largely in line with contribution rates,
which increased sharply in the 1970s but have been constant since then, and covered
wages, which fluctuated around 60 percent for most of the period. This explains why
revenues from contributions have remained relatively constant as a percent of GDP since
1980.
Old-age benefits, including supplementary and survivor benefits, were less than 1
percent of GDP in 1950 but increased steadily since then and reached nearly 7 percent in
1998 (Table 9). The old-age scheme produced a small deficit in 1998, equivalent to
0.4 percent of GDP. However, adding the government transfers that are made by design,
the total "deficit" for the old age scherne amounted to CHF 6.7 billion or 1.8 percent of
GDP.
26The public pillar is required to maintain a reserve fund that covers one year's
benefits 23. The system has failed to achieve this since 1980. The gap was small in the
early 1990s but widened considerably in the past couple of years. It stood at 82 percent of
paid benefits in 1998, effectively covering 10 months' expenditure (Table 10). The
capital fund, which corresponds to 5.7 percent of GDP, was invested in domestic bank
deposits, loans, and government bonds for most of the period since the creation of the
public pillar in 1948. However, following a 1997 relaxation of investment rules that
aimed at raising its profitability, the fund placed 7 percent in Swiss equities and 2 percent
in foreign bonds in 1998.
Revenues of the disability insurance scheme rose from 0.3 percent of GDP in
1960 to 1.9 percent in 1998 (Table 11). Government transfers cover by design half the
spending on disability pensions. The disability insurance scheme has been running a
growing annual deficit that was equivalent to 0.2 percent of GDP in 1998 (Table 12).
Combining the two components of the public pillar shows total revenues for 1998
of CHF 32.6 billion, total payments of CHF 34.7 billion, and a total deficit CHF 2.1
billion. These correspond to 8.5, 9.1 and 0.6 percent of GDP. Government transfers
covered 27 percent of total benefits. Adding the government transfers, which correspond
to 2.4 percent of GDP, brings the total "deficit" of the first pillar to 3 percent of GDP.
Although reliance on government financing was part of the original design of the public
pillar, the growing "deficit" may require increased government transfers which may in
turn generate  pressures for significant changes in the structure of the system. The total
cost rate of old age and survivor pensions, expressed in relation to the covered wage bill,
amounted to 11.7 percent in 1998, while that of disability insurance equaled 3.5 percent.
2.5  Future Prospects
The combined cost rate of the two systems is 15.2 percent of covered wages and is
likely to increase further. This is because, like most other European countries, the Swiss
pension system will face considerable pressures in the future as a result of demographic
aging. The old age dependency ratio is expected to increase substantially, because of
declining fertility and increased longevity. It is forecast to reach 45% by 2030 and 47%
by 2040, up from 28% at present. To meet the financial pressures of aging, several
measures are under consideration. Increasing the normal retirement age features
prominently among them, although it is likely to face strong political opposition.  Swiss
experts are considering linking the retirement age to life expectancy at retirement, either
by aiming to keep the length of retirement life constant or by keeping the ratio of the
passive to active life constant.
23  Some  Swiss  experts  argue  that  maintaining  a reserve  fund  for liquidity  purposes  is unnecessary  in
countries  with  well  developed  financial  markets  where  liquidity  needs  can be met  more  efficiently  by
short-term  borrowing.
27On the financing  front consideration  is given to raising  the contribution  rate or
using earmarked  taxes, such  as a percentage  of VAT,  a special  tax on energy,  a wealth
tax, or inheritance  tax (IAD  FiSo 1996). Financial  projections,  incorporating  the effects
of the 10th  revision, show  that expenditures  will continue  to exceed  revenues  and the
reserve  fund will be exhausted  in 2010. With unchanged  policies,  the contribution  rate
may  have to be raised to 10%  and a 1% VAT rate allocated  to the pension  system  to
maintain  financial  equilibrium. Reliance  on VAT  revenues  would  imply a substantial
increase  in government  financing.  Although  no decisions  have  been taken yet, the modest
level of public  pensions  and the existence  of a well-funded  private pillar suggest  that the
transition  will be easier  to manage  in Switzerland  than in most other European  countries.
28III.  THE SECOND PILLAR
3.1  Nature of System
One of the most intriguing aspects of the Swiss second pillar is its complexity and
the difficulty of providing a precise characterization of its nature. This impedes a clear
understanding of its functioning and an evaluation of its performance. The complexity of
the system is related to the fact that while the law imposes minimum legal requirements,
it leaves most of the terms and conditions and operational elements of pension funds to be
determined by the pension plan. The founders of pension funds enjoy considerable
freedom in determining the level of benefits and contributions, the investment policies,
the use of insurance, and the level of transparency and communication  with affiliates. As
a result, there is wide variation in terms and conditions as well as many different types of
funds. As the mandate is imposed on employers, there is also a large number of pension
funds.
The complexity of the system is made more opaque by the lack of transparency
and the limited availability of data on the investment performance of pension funds.
Detailed aggregate data on pension funds, based on a bi-annual survey undertaken by the
Federal Office of Statistics, are published every other year with a two-year delay24.
Although wide-ranging and comprehensive, the bi-annual surveys do not report any data
on individual pension funds, while the information they provide on the financial accounts
of pension funds and especially on their investment performance and operating efficiency
suffers from many shortcomings.
These problems are, however, mitigated by the highly sophisticated set of
minimum requirements that are imposed by the law and its implementing regulations.
These specify the posting of minimum credits to notional individual retirement accounts
that vary by age as well as the provision of disability and term life insurance (that also
take account of projected credits). They also stipulate a minimum rate of interest to be
credited to these accounts 25. Thus, the compulsory element of the second pillar could most
aptly be characterized as a "defined-credits" system.
These requirements aim at the accumulation of a targeted amount of capital. The
law further specifies a minimum annuity conversion rate that ensures that the
accumulated capital is converted into an annual pension that corresponds to around
35 percent of covered earnings. Added to the pension from the public pillar this would
24  For instance,  the results  of the 1996  survey  were published  in  November  1998.
25  This  has been  set at a nominal  4 percent  since  the introduction  of the compulsory  system  in 1985.
The implicit  assumption  appears  to  be that  this is equal  to the projected  long-term  growth  rate of nominal
eamnings.
29ensure that a worker on average earniings  would retire with a 60 to 70 percent replacement
rate.
The law does not specify a minimum contribution rate, but requires that the
contribution of employers is at least equal to that of employees. It also requires that
employees have equal representation at the top governing body of the pension fund.
While there are various requirements aiming at safeguarding the interests of workers,
there is no explicit minimum funding requirement but only a provision that pension funds
must be able to meet their financial obligations.
3.2  Regulation  and Supervision  Agencies
The second pillar is subject to an extensive array of regulations that, in line with
pension fund regulation in most other countries, has prudential and protective objectives.
It aims fundamentally to ensure the financial safety of pension funds and to safeguard the
interests of covered workers. The regulatory regime is of moderate intensity, lying
between the "draconian" orientation of Latin American countries and the more "relaxed"
approach of Anglo-American countries 26.
Supervision is reactive rather than proactive and is institutionally fragmented. It
does not appear to address potential "'moral hazard" problems in an effective way. The
law provides for the creation of a Guarantee Fund to guarantee the minimum benefits
stated in the law as well as a Suppletory Fund (or Substitution or Residual Fund) to cover
uninsured workers but does not seem to include enough safeguards to ensure that
recourse to these two institutions is kept to a minimum.
Second pillar institutions are supervised by a number of authorities. All pension
plans providing the mandatory occupational retirement benefits must register with their
respective supervising authorities. The cantonal authorities designate supervisors to
control the funds within the borders of the individual cantons. Pension funds and social
insurance institutions operating on a national or international level are supervised by the
Federal Office of Social Insurance. Insurance institutions of confederational entities are
under the supervision of the Ministry cf Finance. Life insurance companies, which
undertake the management of pension funds under collective insurance contracts, fall
under the supervision of the Federal Oflfice  for Private Insurance. Overall supervision is
exercised by the Federal Council of Switzerland and the Federal Office of Social
Insurance. The law has created an advisory Federal Commission on Occupational
(Professional) Pensions with representaLtives  from federal and cantonal governments,
employers, employees, and the pension funds.
26  This  distinction  was  drawn  in Vittas  (I998:2-4)  and refers  to  the whole  panoply  of pension  fund
regulations  and not  just to those applicable  on investments  and asset allocation.
30The regulatory framework for pension funds covers a wide area of complex
issues. These range from licensing criteria that define the institutional structure of the
system to rules regarding fund governance, coverage, contribution and benefit levels,
asset allocation and valuation, auditing and supervision, and information disclosure and
publicity standards.
3.3  Institutional Structure
Number of funds. As in other countries where private pensions are offered by
employer-based plans, there are a large number of occupational pension schemes. Pension
institutions can be established as non-profit foundations, as cooperative societies, or as
institutions incorporated under public law. The latter form is only possible for funds
covering employees of public sector entities. In 1996, there were only 39 cooperative
societies and 168 public sector funds. The vast majority of pension institutions, of which
there were nearly 11,600, were created as foundations. They account for 98 percent of
pension institutions and 79 percent of affiliates (Table 14).
The number of institutions declined over the years as part of a long-drawn
consolidation process. There were 17,500 institutions in 1980. The number of affiliates
grew after 1985 but fell slightly in the 1990s. In contrast, the number of beneficiaries has
been on a more steadily rising trend (Table 15).
The multitude of pension institutions provides a misleading picture of the
structure of the Swiss second pillar. Many of the institutions do not operate as traditional
pension funds but as charitable entities offering welfare benefits, while others have been
established as purely financing vehicles. A significant but declining number represents
"frozen" pension funds that have stopped accepting new contributions after the
introduction of the new system in 1985 and remain in existence only for the payment of
benefits. Most of these three categories of institutions do not have active affiliates
(Table 16). Out of 11,600 institutions in 1996, 7,300 had no affiliates and only 4,300 (or
37 percent of the total) had active affiliates.
On the basis of the total number of pension institutions, the average size is less
than 300 affiliates per fund. If only funds with active affiliates are taken into account, the
average size is still only 735 affiliates per fund. This is very low and is due to the large
number of very small funds. Yet despite the large number of institutions, concentration in
the sector is high. The largest 52 funds (representing 1 percent of all funds with
affiliates), each with more than 10,000 members, covered 1.9 million workers or
60 percent of the total (Table 17). They had on average 36,000 affiliates per fund and
CHF 3.5 million in assets and accounted for 53 percent of total assets. However,
concentration in Switzerland is nowhere near the levels found in Latin American
countries, where the total number of funds is less than 20 (in several countries less than
10) and the largest 4 account for more than 70 percent of affiliates and assets.
31In 1996  nearly  2,500 funds with affiliates  had fewer  than 100  members  each,
while there were also some 7,300 funds  with no affiliates.  The large number  of small
institutions  makes  supervision  and transparency  difficult  without  offering  any  real
benefits  to workers.  It is one of the mnajor  weaknesses  of employer-based  schemes,  that is
made worse by the captivity  of workers,  who do not have  the right to switch  funds
(except  when they change  employers)  and can exert little direct  influence  on the
efficiency  and performance  of the funds.
Licensing  and Registration.  Only those  institutions  that offer the mandatory
minimum  benefits  are required  to be registered  under  the law on occupational  pensions.
In 1996  some  3,075 institutions  (or about 27 per cent)  of the total number  of pension
institutions  were registered.  More than 60% of pension  institutions  had no affiliates  and
were not registered.  An additional  10 percent of institutions  (about 1,200  funds)  had
affiliates  but were not registered  under the law. The nonregistered  funds covered  about
8 percent of affiliates  and presumably  operated  "top hat" schemes  for senior  staff.  Most
of them are set by foundations  and cover private sector  employees.
Employers  must affiliate  with a registered  pension  institution  for the minimum
legal benefits  but they  may affiliate  with more than  one registered  pension  institution  as
well as with nonregistered  institutions.  The latter explains  the use of nonregistered
institutions  for "top-hat"  benefits.  Presumably  some  employees  with benefits  that go
beyond the minimum  are affiliated  with more  than one pension  institution,  giving rise to
some  double  counting  of covered  employees.
As in other countries  with employer-based  schemes,  licensing  and registration
criteria  are not particularly  onerous.  Registered  pension  institutions  must provide  a copy
of the pension  plan to their supervisory  agency,  must create its governing  bodies  in
accordance  with the provisions  of the law (equal  representation  of covered  employees  on
the board of trustees,  appointment  of aLuditors  and pension  experts,  preparation  of an
annual  report,  etc.), and must provide  a reassurance  that they can maintain  the appropriate
accounting  records and ensure  the payiment  of mandated  benefits.  There are no minimum
capital  and membership  requirements  and no explicit  minimum  funding  provisions,
although  expert  certification  of long-term  financial  balance  is required.  Pension
institutions  with fewer  than 100  active affiliates  that intend  to assume  fully the various
insurance  risks must take additional  measures  to ensure  their financial  equilibrium. 27
Pension  institutions  that do not satisfy  the minimal  registration  conditions  are deleted
from the register.  Unless  employers  affiliate  with another  pension  institution,  their
employees  are compulsorily  covered  by the Suppletory  Institution  (see below).
27  This is a vague and weak  provision  with  potentially  important  ramifications  for some  workers. In
1996,  2,500  pension  institutions  had fewer  than 100  insured  workers  for a total of 80 thousand  affiliates.
However,  it is not indicated  how many of these institutions  assumed  all the various  insurance  risks.
32Classification of funds. Swiss law and statistics classify pension funds by several
characteristics. First, there is classification by legal form (private sector, subdivided
between foundations and cooperatives, and public sector). Then, there is classification by
registration or not. However, of greater functional interest is the classification by form of
administration, risk management and type of plan.
There are five different forms of administration. Operation as a single-employer
entity and participation in multi-employer funds, which are subdivided into four types.
*  Collective  funds, which are organized by insurance companies, banks or fiduciary
institutions. They offer the benefits of collective administration, but maintain
separate accounts as well as separate rules and conditions for the occupational
pension schemes of participating employers.
*  Professional association  funds, which are open to association members and
generally operate one scheme with similar rules, conditions, and accounts for all
participating employers.
*  Multi-employerfunds for public sector entities, which are created for employees
of public sector entities.
*  Conglomerate group  funds, which are set up for the companies of particular
groups.
In 1996, there were 1684 multi-employer pension institutions, covering 279,000
employers and 2.83 million affiliates (representing 90% of all affiliates). Most of these
multi-employer funds have low memberships as only 559 institutions reported more than
500 insured workers in 1996 (accounting for 88 percent of all affiliates but clearly
including some large single-employer funds).
With regard to risk management the law distinguishes five types of institutions:
*  autonomousfunds without any reinsurance cover (these are generally created by
large employers and multi-employer institutions and provide in-house insurance
for old age, disability and survivorship to their members without contracting out
any risk coverage to private insurance companies);
*  autonomous  funds with reinsurance cover (similar to the first type except that
they may be supported by some form of reinsurance --"excess-of-loss" or "stop
loss" contracts);
*  semi-autonomous or mixedfunds (these cover the risks of old age benefits, but
transfer to an insurance company the risks of survivorship and disability
pensions);
*  insured fnds  (these insure all types of benefits with insurance companies); and
*  savings funds (these accumulate the savings capital but cover none of the risks
involved).
Small companies usually affiliate their employees with insured funds operated by
collective or pooled foundations. These are mostly established by life insurance
33companies and involve the contracting out of full insurance coverage for old age,
disability and survivorship benefits. The premium payable to life insurance companies is
uniform for all companies and is approved by the Federal Office of Private Insurance.
Life insurance companies compete through the level of dividends for their member funds,
which are used either for premium bonuses (in defined contribution plans) or cost
reduction for the employers (in defined benefit plans).
Enactment of the compulsory law had a positive impact on the role of insured
funds.  Despite the fall in their number, which resulted from the decision of many smaller
employers to join larger collective sc:hemes,  the number of affiliates covered by insured
funds increased. This happened at the introduction of the new law when the number of
affiliates of insured funds rose nearly threefold, while that of self-insured autonomous
funds increased by half. In 1996, insured funds had a slightly higher share of affiliates
than autonomous funds (Table 18).
The number of pension funds in the second pillar has been on a steady decline.
When occupational pension funds became mandatory, many employers decided to join
collective foundations and gradually dissolved existing funds. In 1978, there were 14,000
autonomous, semi-autonomous, insured and savings funds. This number decreased to
6,000 in 1987 and further to just over 3,000 in 1996.
Type of Plan. Plans can be designed at the discretion of the foundations as long
as the minimum requirements for benefits are fulfilled. The funds are also free in their
choice of plan type, i.e. defined contribution or defined benefit plans. Defined
contribution plans provide benefits based on the contributions made by and on behalf of
the individual member with the interest accrued over the contribution period. Defined
benefit plans provide retirement benefits, which are defined as a percentage of previous
earnings, e.g. final pay, final average, or career average earnings.
In 1996 the vast majority of funds (80 percent) operated as defined contribution
plans. They covered 70 percent of all affiliates, up from 57 percent in 1987 (Table 19).
The number of DC funds fell by half between 1987 and 1996 (from 7,101 to 3,454),
while that of DB plans declined by 30 percent (from 1101 to 759). It should be noted,
however, that the fall in the number of funds with active affiliates is overstated in the
reported statistics because the 1987 dala included some 2,278 "frozen" funds, while in
later surveys they were excluded. The average size of a DC fund was 640 affiliates in
1996 and that of DB plans 1212.
The conversion of DB into DC plans is continuing. The pension funds of the
Federal Government and Canton and City of Zurich are the latest to announce their
conversion to DC plans for all new employees.
343.4  Fund  Governance
Joint  Administration  with  Equal Representation.  Pension  funds must  be
legally separated from their sponsoring employers. As already noted, the vast majority of
pension funds are established as foundations. According to pension fund regulations,
registered pension funds, i.e. those providing at least the mandatory minimum benefits,
must be administered jointly by employers and employees with an equal number of
representatives in each of the executive committees of the fund. The law also stipulates
that the employer representatives should not include any senior managers 2".
Decisions related to the statutes and governing regulations of the fund, benefit
levels and contribution rates as well as investment policy are made jointly. However, all
decisions related to benefits exceeding the legal minimum are at the sole discretion of the
employer. Companies often establish a separate legal entity for the administration of
benefits, which were either granted to employees before the introduction of the law, or
which supplement the minimum benefits on a voluntary basis.
Every foundation is governed by a board of trustees, which decides on the benefits
and funding of the plan, makes asset investment decisions, supervises all activities of the
foundation, and provides information to participants and supervisory authorities. Persons
entrusted with the management and auditing of a foundation are personally liable for any
losses or damages caused willfully. The sponsoring employer has no direct power over
the foundation apart from a 50 percent representation on the foundation board. In turn, the
foundation board cannot decide to increase benefits if this would force an employer to
pay contributions in excess of the legally mandated equal matching of employee
contributions. Thus, the effectiveness of pension fund management is greatly dependent
on consensus between employers and foundations.
Conflicts are most likely to arise with respect to the use of excess plan reserves.
The foundation board may theoretically use any such surplus to grant benefit increases. If
the employer would then threaten to reduce contributions accordingly, such move would
be made impossible. Assets of the foundation, however, cannot be taken out by
employers or any of their creditors (Nussbaum and Mosberger 1994). Any moves to
provide non-regular benefits for certain groups or early retirement must be considered by
the board within the legal and financial framework of the pension plan and, if necessary,
accompanied by amendments to the statutes or additional contributions.
Many smaller companies join a pooled pension foundation to avoid the
considerable amount of administrative work involved in setting up their own independent
28  This  is a rare example  of absence  of common  sense.  While  the measure  aims  to create  a greater
balance  of influence  between  worker  and employer  representatives,  it may inadvertently  deprive
foundation  boards  of the professional  expertise  of senior  managers.  The  use of experienced  professionals  as
trustees  may have  contributed  to the greater  sophistication  and  higher investment  performance  of Anglo-
American  pension  funds.
35foundation.  Pooled  foundations  can be autonomous  or established  and administered  by
life insurance  companies,  banks,  pernsion  consulting  firms,  or employers'  associations.  In
such pooling  arrangements,  the individual  occupational  funds keep  their own statutes,
regulations  on contributions  and benefits  as well as their investment  committee.  In
addition,  a joint foundation  board is established,  which  is composed  of representatives  of
the affiliated  funds  and the managing  life insurance  company  or bank.  This board is
responsible  for cash flow and account  management,  benefit  administration,  and the
investment  of assets according  to the provisions  of the law. Additional  investment
restrictions  may be imposed  by the foundation  board,  which  must be accepted  by the
affiliated  funds. The individual  funds are administratively  and actuarially  separated,  but
in most cases,  their assets are invested  jointly. If an affiliated  company  or pension  fund
defaults,  the pooled  foundation  is nol liable. Instead,  the respective  fund is assessed
individually  and, if applicable,  supported  with resources  from the Guarantee  Fund.
Asset  Segregation,  Internal  Controls  and External  Custody.  The Swiss law
requires  the creation  of a separate  legal entity  and the segregation  of assets from those  of
the sponsoring  employer.  The management  of the pension  institution  is responsible  for
the maintenance  of separate  accounts,  the administration  of contributions  and benefits,
and the investment  of assets.  As already  noted, managers,  auditors  and pension  experts
are personally  liable  for any losses suffered  by the pension  fund as a result of breach  of
duty or gross  negligence.  However,  there are no detailed  requirements  on the efficacy  of
internal  control  systems  and no specific  provisions  for the use of external  custodians.
Helbling  (1991:344)  mentions  a rather simplistic  view of asset segregation  that
involves  the mere use of separate  safes  for the safekeeping  of securities 29. There is no
requirement  to create  robust internal  control  systems  in which internal  custodians  would
aim to prevent  the misappropriation  of funds and would  also be responsible  for ensuring
that asset managers  comply  with all asset allocation  rules (those  imposed  by the
authorities  as well  as those established  by the board  of trustees  or its investment  policy
committee).  To enable  internal  custodians  to discharge  their duties, they should  have a
direct  reporting  line to the board of trustees  as well as to the supervisory  agency. There  is
also no legal requirement  that any pension  funds,  large or small,  that do not operate  such
stringent  internal  control systems  must employ  external  custodians. And no indication
that external  custodians  should  be selected  from an approved  list of authorized  custodians
with adequate  human,  technical  and financial  resources  to provide  an efficient  and
effective  custodial  service.
The law  places clear limits on the loans  and investnents that pension  funds can
make in their sponsoring  employer,  although  these are high by the standards  of Anglo-
29  This is another  example  of lack of conimon  sense  in the regulatory  framework.  It appears  to be
placing  excessive  trust  in the integrity  of employers  and pension find managers.
36American countries 30. Pension funds are also required report to their supervisory authority
any employer contributions that have not been paid for three months. But without
adequate internal control systems, breaches of these important rules could go undetected
for long periods and could endanger the financial security of the pension funds. These
problems can be very important in the case of small pension funds that are established by
small employers but are not insured.
Appointment of Auditors and Pension Experts. In contrast to the lax treatment
of internal control systems and the use of internal or external custodians, the law is very
clear on the appointment of auditors and pension experts. Both of these must be
independent from the founders and managers of the pension finds.
The duties of auditors include the annual verification of compliance with the law
and its implementing regulations and the legality of pension fund operations (including
the receipt of contributions and payment of benefits as well as the management of assets).
Auditors are also required to examine the annual accounts of the pension institution and
to submit a written report to the board of trustees on the findings of their audit.
Pension experts are required to determine periodically that pension institutions are
able to meet their obligations and that the terms and conditions of their pension plan
comply with legal provisions. Pension experts play in this sense a role similar to that of
appointed actuaries in Anglo-American countries, although pension experts may also
include lawyers, accountants and others. Pension experts must have a federal diploma of
experts in pension insurance.
Both auditors and pension experts are required to report to the competent
supervisory authority any infractions of rules by pension institutions as well as any
problems that would require immediate intervention. They must also notify to the
competent supervisory authority the termination of their contract.
Auditors and pension experts address some of the issues that would be the
responsibility of custodians. But their involvement is infrequent and does not cover day-
to-day operations. They are therefore unable to prevent a misuse or misappropriation of
funds, although their involvement ensures that any malpractice does not go undetected for
too long.
30  Claims  on employers  must be limited  to less  than 20 percent  of pension  fund assets  if they  are not
guaranteed  or secured  but they can be as high as 100  percent  if they are secured  by real  estate  and other
collateral  or guaranteed  by a public  authority.  Thus,  public  sector funds  can effectively  operate  in an
unfunded  basis  without  violating  the law.
373.5  Coverage:  Affiliates  and Beneficiaries
Affiliates. The law mandates compulsory coverage for all workers in dependent
employment whose annual income exceeds a minimum level that is set annually and is
equal to the maximum pension from the public pillar.  In 1999, this was equal to CHF
24,120, equivalent to about 40% of average earnings. Persons earning less than this
amount will reach a replacement rate of at least 60 percent through their public pension
alone and thus their compulsory participation in the second pillar is not deemed
necessary. Enrollment is mandatory at age 17 for death and disability benefits and at age
24 for retirement benefits 3". Compulsory coverage ends at termination of employment, at
retirement, or when the income of the insured worker falls below the minimum threshold.
There is considerable difference in the compulsory coverage of the first and
second pillars. In addition to workers earning less than the stipulated minimum and those
of less than 24 years of age, self-employed persons as well as unemployed workers,
disabled workers, and those working for less than three months are not subject to
compulsory participation, but may enroll on a voluntary basis. No estimates of the
number of eligible employees are available but this is clearly much smaller than the total
labor force.
Insured workers have no choice of fund in which they make contributions as they
have to join the pension institution established or selected by their employers. However,
when they change employment they may leave their accumulated capital with the pension
fund of the company from which they are leaving. Workers may thus belong to several
funds, only one of which can be active.
Before 1985, slightly more thian 50 per cent of the Swiss labor force was covered
by occupational pension schemes. The introduction of the compulsory system led to a
strong growth of second pillar coverage. Between 1984 and 1987, the number of insured
workers increased by 67 percent compared to annual increases of about 3 percent before
the law was passed. In 1997, the second pillar covered an estimated 3.1 million
employees (Table 20), of which about two thirds were male and one third female. These
figures include some double counting as many insured workers belong to more than one
pension fund. The correct number of insured workers is below 3 million, probably around
2.8 million. This would correspond to 74 percent of the labor force.
However, non-compliance is rnuch smaller than these estimates might imply.
Recent years have seen a decline in coverage, perhaps because of the economic
difficulties of early and mid-1990s, the growth in unemployment and the increasing use
of disability pensions by retrenching companies in declining industries. Taking account
of all those who are not subject to compulsory participation and comparing with the
number of eligible employees, effective coverage is likely to be well above 90 percent. In
31  Enrolment  is compulsory  as of the l" of January  after reaching  the respective  age.
38fact, only 2,500 employees are affiliated with the Suppletory Institution, the residual fund
that covers all uninsured eligible workers.
Beneficiaries. Retirement ages are currently set at 65 years for men and 62 years
for women. Early retirement is possible according to the statutes and regulations of the
individual pension funds. Unlike the number of affiliates, which fell in recent years, the
number of beneficiaries has increased steadily over time and reached an estimated 0.67
million in 1997. Nearly half of benefits are paid as survivor and disability pensions with
the number of old age retirees around 0.35 million. The ratio of beneficiaries to affiliates
has increased steadily from 17 percent in 1970 to 22 percent in 1997. Old age pensions
amounted to 0.35 million in 1996 or 30 percent of old age people. Thus, the second pillar
still has a long way to go before it reaches universal coverage of old people (Table 21).
3.6  Contributions
The pension funds in the second pillar are basically free in their choice of
financing mechanism as long as they are able to meet their obligations. The funds'
financial resources must be sufficient to cover expenditure for the old age, disability and
survivors' pensions and the compulsory transfers that must be made to the Guarantee
Fund (see below).  The majority of funds have chosen the mechanism of full funding.
However, the cantonal pension funds, which tend to operate as defined benefit plans, are
allowed to be partially funded. Because of the presence of government guarantees they
are legally allowed to be underfunded by up to 25 percent of their actuarial liabilities.
Except for the guarantees given to public sector pension institutions, the second
pillar is based exclusively on contributions by employers and employees and the
investment income earned on accumulated reserves. Unlike the first pillar, government
authorities are not required to make any contributions. Compulsory contributions are
levied only on the "coordinated earnings" of covered workers. These are set each year as
the income between the maximum public pension and 3 times that level. In 1999, the
lower and upper limits amounted respectively to CHF 24,120 and CHF 72,360. These
correspond to about 40 and 120 percent of average eamings. Thus, the maximum
applicable income for compulsory contributions to the second pillar is CHF 48,240. The
minimum applicable income corresponds to 1/8 of the maximum pension in the public
pillar or CHF 3,015. This is used in all cases where the coordinated income of the insured
worker is lower, i.e. it is used for all workers who eamrn  more than CHF 24,120 but less
than CHF 27,135.
The law sets the minimum and maximum amount of "coordinated income" on
which compulsory contributions and the legally required benefits must be based.
Individual pension plans may impose no upper limit on the covered income and may also
dispense with the lower threshold. The former would enable high-income workers to
attain a reasonable replacement rate from both pillars, while the latter would allow low-
39income  workers  to participate  in the second  pillar  for the whole  of their wage income  and
thus benefit  more  fully from the contributions  made by employers.
In 1996,  out of 4285 institutions  with affiliates,  only 689 funds (16%  of the total
but covering  36 percent of affiliated  workers)  applied  the legal limit  on coordinated
income.  A small  number  (32) applied a limit below  the legal limit, 356 institutions
applied  a ceiling  of up to twice the legal limit  and 814 funds  applied a ceiling  that was
higher  than twice  the legal limit. However,  the largest  number  of pension  funds  (2394 or
56 percent  of the total and accounting  for 39 percent  of affiliates)  applied  no ceiling  on
the level of coordinated  income.
Unlike  most other  countries  with compulsory  second  pillars (Argentina,  Chile,
Mexico,  Peru, Australia,  Hungary,  KIazakhstan,  or Poland),  the rate of contribution  for the
Swiss second  pillar is not fixed by law. Contribution  rates are set by each pension  fund.
Employers'  contributions,  however,  must be at least equal to the amounts  contributed  by
the employees.  There appears  to be a wide variation  in the pattern and rates of
contribution  specified  by different  plans.  Data for 1996  show  that 1490  (34 percent of all
funds  with affiliates)  applied a fixed contribution  rate on all affiliates  irrespective  of their
age or seniority,  while 2318 funds (54 percent  of the total)  varied  the employee
contribution  rate by age or seniority.  The first group covered 1.15  million  affiliates  (37
percent of the total) and the second  group 1.82  million  affiliates  (58%  of the total).
The remaining  funds  either did not require  any employee  contributions  or used a different
system.  The vast majority  of those funds that imposed  a uniform  contribution  rate applied
a rate between  5 and 9 percent of insured  earnings.
Total  contribution  revenues by all second  pillar  institutions  amounted  in 1997  to
CHF 24 billion,  corresponding  to approximately  11 percent of the earnings  covered  by
the first  pillar. Thus, the total contribution  rate for the first and second  pillar,  including
old age, survivors  and disability  pensions  and the transfers  made by the federal  and
cantonal  governments,  amounts  to 24.3 percent of covered  earnings.
Contribution  revenues  increased  from 3.8 percent of GDP in 1970  to over 6.5 %
in the l 990s  (Table  22). Employers  account  for 63 percent of all contributions  and thus
provide  substantially  more than  half the total.  The higher share  paid  by employers  may be
explained  by additional  contributions  made in defined-benefit  plans.
3.7  Benefits
The retirement  benefits  provided  by the second  pillar depend  on the design  of the
individual  occupational  pension  plans..  In general,  benefits  are paid in the form of
pensions  rather than lump sums, but exceptions  are made for very low amounts  of
retirement  capital  and for the purchase  of housing.  Lump sum  payments  are also made
when workers  become  self-employed  and when they permanently  leave  Switzerland.  In
all cases,  the spouse's agreement  is required.  In case of divorce,  the lump sum is split
40between the two ex-spouses. Lump-sum withdrawals must be requested three years
before retirement (in an effort to reduce moral hazard), but in practice most plans let
people opt at retirement.
The application of quasi-compulsory annuitization implies that the accumulated
capital is not bequeathable to the heirs of covered workers. However, occupational
pension plans are required by law to provide pensions to dependent children at the time of
retirement. These are not survivor orphan benefits but additional pensions for retired
workers, who happen to have young children. The role of these pension benefits is
unclear, but their aggregate amounts are insignificant. However, their existence adds a
redistributive element in the second pillar and helps to confuse its objectives.
Total benefits increased from CHF 1.3 billion (1.5 percent of GDP) in 1970 to
CHF 16 billion (4.4 percent of GDP) in 1997 (Table 23). Pension payments accounted for
88 percent of total benefits in 1970 but their share of total benefits has fallen steadily and
now accounts for 81 percent of the total. The average old age pension from the second
pillar amounted in 1996 to CHF 25,027 and the average lump sum payment to CHF
93,500.
Unfortunately, it is not possible to add the average pension from the second pillar
to that received from the first pillar in order to obtain the average pension from both
pillars. This is because the pension from the second pillar is based on the concept of
coordinated earnings and is likely to apply to a typical worker with a much higher total
income than the typical recipient of the average public pension.
Defined Credits. The law defines the minimum requirements based on the
concept of defined credits. Retirement benefits are calculated based on "old age credits"
accruing in "shadow" or "notional" individual retirement accounts. Interest is also
credited in these accounts. The minimum rate has been set at 4 percent since 1985.
Assuming an average wage growth of 4 percent, this interest rate would enable the
pension fund to keep the ratio between retirement benefit and insured earnings, i.e. the
replacement rate, constant.
By targeting a certain replacement rate, this method of calculation introduces an
element of defined benefit schemes into defined contribution plans 32. The old age credits
are calculated as percentages of the coordinated income scaled according to age groups in
order to reach a maximum retirement capital equivalent to 500 percent of the annual
coordinated income for men at age 65 and 479 percent for women at age 62 (Table 24).
32  The Swiss  second  pillar  may be seen as an early example  of the use of notional  accounts  albeit on
a funded  basis  (unlike  the notional  defined  contribution  system  developed  by Swedish  actuaries  that  is
unfunded).  It may also  be seen  as an early  example  of the use of cash  balance  plans.
41Defined benefit plans usually aim for higher replacement rates that are calculated
on the covered earnings. Of affiliates covered by defined benefit plans, 80 percent belong
to funds that promise a replacement rate ranging from 60 to 74 percent. As already noted,
a large number of funds impose no limit on the coordinated income that is taken into
account, while many others impose a limit that is higher than the legal amount.
Annuity  Conversion.  The accumulated retirement capital is converted to an
annual pension by using an annuity conversion factor. The law and its implementing
regulations stipulate a minimum annuity conversion factor of 7.2 percent. This has
remained unchanged since 1985 despite considerable fluctuations in interest rates and a
persistent gradual increase in longevity. Given a full career contribution period, the
mandatory occupational retirement pension thus amounts to 36 percent of coordinated
earnings for men and 34.5 percent for women. The annuity conversion factor falls by 0.2
for every year of earlier retirement and increases by 0.2 for every year of later retirement.
These imply a growing accrual decrement in the annual pension for each additional year
of early retirement and a declining accrual increment for each additional year of late
retirement.
The conversion factor of 7.2 percent corresponds to a single annuity for a period
of 20 years at a 4 percent discount rate and an initial commission of 2.15 percent.
Alternatively, it corresponds to a joint and 60 percent contingent annuity33  where the
average covered worker has a life expectancy of 17 years, his or her spouse survives for
an additional 5 years, the discount rate is still 4 percent, and the initial commission is
2.53 percent. Compared to voluntary annuities obtained from insurance companies, the
conversion factor of 7.2 percent appears quite reasonable. These calculations do not take
into account any bonus payments madie  to compensate workers for the effects of inflation.
Second pillar pension benefits are not indexed to inflation but pension funds make ad hoc
adjustments depending on their financial situation. Without detailed data on projected
mortality rates of compulsory and voluntary annuitants and inflation adjustments it is not
possible to assess the "fairness" of the resulting pension payments 34.
33  A contingent  annuity  is one  where  the beneficiary  continues  to receive  the full pension if his or
her spouse  dies but the pension  reduces  to a pre-specified  level  (60 percent  in the Swiss  second  pillar)  if the
main  beneficiary  dies.
34  The 1998  annual  report  of the Federal  Office  of Private  Insurance  suggests  that the implied  rate of
return is higher  than 5 percent.  A 5 percent  discount  would  produce a 7.2  percent annuity  conversion  if the
life expectancy  of a single  immediate  annuity  was 23 years (with a commission  charge  of 2.88 percent)  or
if a joint and 60 percent  contingent  annuity  was paid for 20 years to the main  beneficiary  and for an
additional  6 years to the surviving  spouse  (wilth  a 2 percent commission  charge).  No data are published  on
the projected  mortality  tables  for annuitants  buat  the FOPI  remark implies  a substantial  increase  in
longevity.  An alternative  interpretation  is that bonus  payments  add more  than I percent  to the discount  rate.
To the extent  that these  projections  are validated  by longevity  trends in Switzerland,  they should  raise
concerns  about the exposure  of insurance  companies  offering fixed  annuities  to a large  reinvestment  risk
arising  from the mismatching  of the duration  of their assets  and liabilities  (see below).
42A major weakness of the compulsory system, which is shared by most public and
private compulsory pillars, is that it forces all retiring workers to purchase the same type
of annuity, irrespective of their individual circumstances and needs. But assessing the
potential adverse impact on economic welfare of this provision would require
considerable more data. Some of these would need to cover individual circumstances
from the point of view of financial standing, socioeconomic background, mortality
experience, and risk tolerance, while other data would need to focus on the solutions and
outcomes that greater choice in a more competitive environment could offer.
Disability and Survivor Pensions. The compulsory system also requires the
provision of disability and survivors' pensions. The Swiss system differs from pension
reforms in Latin American countries where responsibility for disability pensions has been
shifted to the private pillar. In Switzerland disability pensions are provided by both
pillars.
Disability pensions are calculated in a similar way to old age benefits but also
take account of projected credits but without interest. The degree of disability and the
remaining years until regular retirement are taken into account. Pensions for widows
amount to 60 percent of the old age pension and pensions for children and orphans to
20 percent. Occupational disability and survivor pensions may be reduced if the sum of
total benefits from the first and second pillars exceeds 90 percent of the previous annual
earnings of the insured worker.
The financing of disability and survivor pensions is determined by the rules of the
pension plan. One approach that may be followed by employers who apply the same
contribution rate on all employees and who do not wish to increase their own
contributions above the legally required amnount  is to apply a declining share of
contributions to the financing of disability and survivor benefits (Table 25).
Inflation Indexation. Adjustment to increases in the cost of living is mandatory
every 3 years for disability and survivor pensions. Old age pensions, however, are
adjusted at the discretion of the individual pension funds according to their financial
situation. As already noted, allowing for these adjustments, the total rate of return for
pensioners of the second pillar would be higher than the discount rate implied in the
minimum annuity conversion factor.
Transition Generation. For the entry or transition generation, defined as all
persons above the age of 25 at the date of effectiveness of the law, pension funds are
obliged to take special measures within their financial possibilities. Beneficiaries during
the first 9 years of the law received minimum benefits determined by the Federal Council
and were financed from an additional contribution set aside by the funds.
433.8  Tax Treatment
Switzerland is one of few countries in the world that applies a broadly consistent
tax treatment of all pillars of the pension system. There are small differences in the
treatment of the three pillars. The general approach is EET, i.e. contributions and
investment income are exempt, but benefits are taxed. Moreover, unlike other OECD
countries, no ceilings are imposed on investment income, while lump sum payments are
subject to tax.
The main deviation from this approach is the limit imposed on contributions to
the third pillar. There is also a proposal to place a limit on the tax-exempt contributions in
the second pillar. The proposed salary limit is CHF 300,000, which is 5 times the level of
average earnings. As no ceiling is imposed on the contributions to the public pillar, this
proposal is likely to face considerable opposition.
Another exception to the conisistent  application of rules was the exemption of
second pillar benefits from taxation for the first 15 years of the compulsory system. A
further deviation concerns the special treatment of withdrawals for housing, which are not
taxed as lump sums but are first converted into equivalent annuity income and taxed
accordingly. Although they represent departures from the application of a fully consistent
tax treatment on pensions, the Swiss system suffers from fewer such problems than any
other country.
3.9  Vesting and Portability
As in all other aspects of private pension provision, the rules on vesting and
portability of pension rights are set out in the pension plans, but subject to some minimal
legal provisions. A new law on the portability of vested benefits was enacted in 1993 and
became effective on January 1, 1995. This extended minimum legal rights to super-
obligatory benefits. Upon changing employment, the beneficiary has a choice of leaving
the retirement capital with the pension fund, provided the old employer agrees, or
transferring it to the fund of the new employer.
The transfer value is calculated according to three different methods and the
highest sum resulting from these calculations is applied. The first method varies
depending on the type of plan.  In defmed contribution plans, the transfer sum is equal to
the contributions made by and on behalf of the affiliate plus accrued interest of at least
4 percent annually. In defined benefit plans, accrued pension rights are equal to the
insured final benefits for a full career worker multiplied by the fraction of a worker's
service (and completed contribution years) in relation to a full career necessary to receive
the final benefits. The present value of accrued benefits is then established by accepted
actuarial rules and transferred to the new pension fund. The entry capital necessary upon
joining a defined benefit pension plan at mid-career is calculated accordingly. If the
transfer sum is insufficient, additional capital may be necessary. Employers are obliged to
44let new employees buy into the plan if they wish. Some employers even offer to make up
for part of the shortfall and also give loans to enable employees to buy into the plan.
The second and third methods use different definitions of the minimum transfer
value.  According to the second method (given in article 17) the transfer value is equal to
the entry capital a worker may have paid into the fund plus interest and his own
contributions during service increased by 4 percent per year after age 20 but up to 100
percent of his contributions 35. This amount may be reduced by premiums charged for
disability, survivor and other benefits (administrative costs are not listed as deductible
items). The third definition (given in article 18) is equal to the balance outstanding on
their "notional" retirement accounts. When a worker does not immediately join a new
pension fund, because of unemployment, part-time work, earnings below the coordinated
threshold or other reasons, the transfer sum is held in a frozen account or is placed in a
special life insurance contract, which is dissolved when the worker joins a new fund.
The new law also addresses the treatment of transfer values in cases of marriage
and divorce. Since the new law may result in actuarial and financial difficulties for some
plans, the Guarantee Fund of the second pillar will close gaps, which are due to the law
until the year 2000.
Before the enactment of the new law, there were disputes regarding the vesting
and portability of super-obligatory benefits, while before the introduction of the
compulsory system in 1985, vesting of employer contributions was graded, starting on
the fifth year of joining a plan and reaching 100 percent on the 30th  year (Hepp 1990:86).
3.10  Withdrawal for Housing
The individual retirement capital in the second pillar may be used for the purchase
of owner-occupied housing. The funds may be used for the purchase of housing,
investment in homes, participation in housing cooperatives and for repayment of the
mortgage principal but not for the financing of home maintenance or mortgage interest
payments. Plan participants may withdraw or pledge the full portable amount they would
be entitled when leaving or switching the fund.  The minimum withdrawal amount is
CHF 20,000 and withdrawals can be requested only once every five years.
35  The  wording  of  this  provision  is  both  unclear  and  unsatisfactory  (article  17  paragraph  1 of the  law
on portability).  The  annual  4 percent  credit  is not in  the  form  of interest  that  compounds  annually  but rather
an additional  payment  that  results  in a graded  vesting  of some  of the  employer  contributions.  If the
employer  and  employee  contribution  rates  are  equal,  then  100  percent  of employer  contributions  will  vest
after  25  years.  But  if the  employer  contribution  rate  is  double  the  rate  of employee  contributions,  only  half
the  total  employer  contributions  will  vest  after  25 years.  Finally,  no  provision  is  made  for interest  on  the
contribution  amounts,  whereas  the  entry  capital  is credited  with  interest.  It would  appear  that  the  wording
of  the  law  penalizes  young  workers  who  move  jobs  frequently.  For  older  workers  and  those  with  longer
service,  the  defmition  of  article  18  would  produce  a higher  transfer  value.
45After the age of 50, participants may withdraw the higher of the amount
corresponding to their entitlement at age 50 or half of their current entitlement. This
regulation is meant to ensure that older beneficiaries are left with some retirement capital
for the provision of pensions. The lower entitlement to disability and death benefits can
be compensated for by purchase of additional insurance coverage at the expense of the
participant.
The amount withdrawn for the purchase of housing is taxable. For tax calculation
purposes, the amount is converted to an annuity and taxed accordingly. The same applies
to pledged capital that is claimed by the creditor. Taxes are payable to the cantons and
vary considerably depending on the canton of residence as well as on the amount
withdrawn. If the purchased housing is sold or rented, the withdrawn amount must be
repaid to the pension fund; the particiipant  may reclaim the tax payment on which no
interest is paid.
Before 1995, participants could withdraw or pledge only half of the compulsory
part of their retirement capital three years before retirement at the earliest. Also, pension
funds were allowed to provide mortgages to their participants and other persons within
the legally established investment limits. The share of mortgages from pension funds,
however, has been declining from 7 percent in 1975 to 4 percent in 1992. At the same
time, the share of mortgages provided by banks increased from 78 to 88 percent. Pension
funds usually are at a disadvantage, since they lack the resources to administer the
mortgage business. Pension funds also rented housing units to their affiliates, usually in
apartment blocks that they owned. An interesting aspect of the sound approach to fund
regulation that is followed in Switzerland is that any subsidies on mortgage interest rates
or on housing rents would not be incurred by the pension fund but directly by the
sponsoring employer  6.
The Swiss housing market is c]haracterized  by a very low rate of home ownership
of only 31 percent, compared to 54 percent in France, 63 percent in the U.K. and
64 percent in the U.S. The average rate hides large differences within Switzerland; in
rural areas, 50 percent of the population own their homes while in the urban areas only
24 percent do so. The low number of hLomeowners  can be attributed to several factors.
Home ownership is not encouraged by Swiss tax laws since owner occupation is taxed
and high taxes are levied on property sales and gains from real estate appreciation. In
cities, home ownership is especially low since partial (etage) ownership in houses was
prohibited until the mid-sixties. In spite of the low home ownership rates, more than 66
36  A fiurther  aspect of the common sense exhibited in Swiss arrangements is that half the rent is
indexed to prices and half to mortgage rates (Helbling  1991:327).
46percent of all housing is owned by individuals. 37 Thus, homeowners are at the samne  time
renters and a considerable number of individuals own more than one property.
Real estate investment of pension funds is often blamed for pushing up property
prices and rents and thus leading to a collapse of the Swiss housing market. However, the
share of dwellings owned by pension funds was less than 8 percent in 1990, which does
not indicate a strong influence of pension funds on the housing market. The new law of
1995 is not expected to have a major impact on home ownership. The amounts that
participants will be able to withdraw or pledge will not be very significant for younger
participants with families, who are most likely to be interested in purchasing homes.38
The administrative burden will increase significantly both for the pension funds and the
cantonal tax administrations. It seems more likely that existing mortgages might be
swapped for more favorable new ones, which make use of the retirement capital. For the
pension funds, both the new housing withdrawal and the portability laws might lead to
increased substitution of defined benefit with defined contribution plans, since full
portability and capital withdrawal increase considerably the uncertainty in the financing
of future liabilities.
3.11  Valuation and Asset Allocation Rules
The law requires pension fund assets to be managed prudently to ensure the
security of assets, achieve a reasonable return on investments, maintain a suitable
diversification of risks, and allow for the liquidity requirements of the plan. The board of
trustees is responsible for setting the direction of investment policy, although asset
allocation has to observe quantitative limits that have been imposed by the regulatory
agency. The limits have been adjusted over time but have in aggregate been non-binding
because of the conservative investment policies pursued over the years by most Swiss
pension funds. There is, however, wide variation in the investment policies pursued by
individual pension funds. Exemptions from the quantitative limits are approved for
pension funds that apply for them, provided they satisfy the supervisors about their ability
to manage the more risky assets.
Investment policies have also been shaped by the valuation and accounting rules
that are applied by Swiss pension funds. The law provides for several alternative methods
37  The remaining  third  is owned  to 8 percent  by construction  and real  estate  companies,  5 percent  by
housing  cooperatives  and  21 percent  by others  which  includes  the public  sector,  private  companies,  and
pension  funds.
38  For example,  a 40 year old  male participant  earning  the average  income  of about  CHF 60,000
with  a contribution  period  of 16  years  would  be entitled  to withdraw  CHF  64,650.  Following  the guideline
that  current  costs  should  not exceed  one third of the annual income,  housing  could  be purchased  for
approximately  CHF 350,000.
47of asset valuation  and allows  the pension  funds to define  their accounting  policies  within
the context  of accepted  Swiss  practice.  The law requires  that accounting  and valuation
rules must be consistent  across  assets and liabilities  and must not be changed  without
adequate  justification.
A very  recent change  in approach  has placed strong  emphasis  on prudent  asset and
liability  management  and has expandled  the scope form investments  in equity  and other
assets by funds  that demonstrate  proifessional  management.  Thus, although  quantitative
limits  are still applied,  the "prudent  expert"  approach  seems  to be gaining  acceptance.
Valuation  Rules. Pension  funds may  use several  methods  of valuation,  ranging
from purchase  or book value to adjusted  book value,  nominal  value, yield-equivalent
value,  market  value,  and average  market  value.  Hepp (1990:204-205)  states  that the most
common  valuation  methods  used by pension  funds were the lower  of book or nominal
value for fixed income  securities  and the lower of book or market  value for equities  and
other real assets.  Under  this approach,  investment  income  includes  received  interest  and
dividend  income and realized  capital  gains  but excludes  unrealized  capital  gains.
These valuation  rules are extremely  conservative  and have distorting  effects  on
both investment  policies  and financial  reporting.  Coupled  with the legal provision  that
pension  funds  must be able to meet  their obligations  at all times,  which is equivalent  to
imposing  a minimum  funding  requirement,  they discourage  investing  in equities  and
valuing  them at market  prices. They favor  investing  in bonds that generate  regular  income
and have  more stable values.  Conservative  valuations  tend to create large  hidden  reserves
and understate  the true share  of equities  and other  real assets,  such as property,  in the
portfolios  of pension  funds.  Failure  to use market values  may also make a mockery  of
applied  quantitative  restrictions  since the true exposure  to individual  assets or to
particular  classes of assets may  be understated.
The valuation  rules used by pension  funds  have been changing  in recent years  in
response  to increasing  pressures  for better  investment  returns,  the strong  performance  of
equity  markets,  and changing  asset allocations.  A survey  conducted  by Robeco  (1998:27-
33) among  some 240 large pension  funds found that in the case of bonds  46 percent of
pension  institutions  use nominal  values,  while 33 percent use market values,  with only
15  percent using the lower  of the two. In the case  of equities,  market  values are used  by
71 percent  of pension  institutions  and book values by 15  percent.
Asset Allocation  Limits.  Investment  regulations  have  long imposed  quantitative
restrictions  on the allocation  of assets of Swiss  pension funds.  In earlier  periods,  these
were more restrictive.  For instance,  before 1985  investments  in foreign  equities  were
permitted  only up to 10 percent  of the lund and only for foreign  equities  listed in a Swiss
stock exchange.  In 1985  the requirement  of listing in a Swiss stock  exchange  was
removed  and in 1989  the limit was increased  to 25 percent.
48The currently imposed limits include a 30 percent limit on domestic equities,
50 percent on domestic real estate, and 75 percent on mortgages (Table 26). The limits on
foreign assets are 30 percent on equities, 30 percent on CHF bonds, and 20 percent on
foreign currency bonds. Additional limits are placed on combinations of asset classes.
The total share of foreign bonds may not exceed 30 percent, total domestic and foreign
equity 50 percent, foreign currency investments 30 percent, and real assets (real estate
and equity) 70 percent. There are also limits on exposure to individual issuers, although
no limits are applied on bonds and deposits held with individual banks and insurance
companies.
The applied investment limits are generally non-binding as pension funds pursue
conservative investment policies. However, the applied limits do not prevent excessive
concentration of risks as well as inefficient practices. For instance, small pension funds
may place all their assets on deposit with one bank or they may invest most of their assets
in one mortgaged property. Moreover, claims on employers are still permitted to a much
greater extent than in Anglo-American countries. Historically, pension funds held large
claims on employers. In the 1940s, these amounted to over 25 percent of total assets for
private sector funds but declined to less than 5 percent since the mid-i 980s. Public sector
pension funds still had nearly 60 percent of their assets in employer claims in the mid-
1980s (Hepp 1990:215). These were still as high as 31 percent of assets in 1996 (FOS
1998:21).
Allowing pension funds to hold large uninsured and unguaranteed claims on their
sponsoring employers undermines the principle of external funding on which the second
pillar is based. As already noted, public sector pension institutions are allowed to be
formally underfunded by 25 percent if their liabilities are guaranteed by the federal or
cantonal governments. Allowing for another 30 percent of assets to be represented by
loans to employers, often arising from contribution arrears, reduces considerably the
effective level of funding. There is a gradual move away from holding claims on
employers, but the pace of change could be accelerated by permitting only equity
investments in the sponsoring employer, up to no more than 5 or at most 10 percent of the
fund, and replacing existing claims with marketable bonds.
As already noted, a very recent change in approach emphasizes prudent
management. This is likely to free the pension funds that demonstrate a sophisticated and
professional management from the traditional quantitative limits.
3.12  Investment Performance
The Swiss pension funds have accumulated huge resources and have become a
major force in the domestic financial system. Their total assets increased steadily over the
years. From CHF 33 billion (36 percent of GDP) in 1970, they reached an estimated CHF
379 billion in 1997, equivalent to 102 percent of GDP. This excludes CHF 85 billion
(23 percent of GDP) that were managed by insurance companies. Total pension assets
49thus amount  to 125  percent  of GDP. Switzerland  is one of four countries  where  the total
assets of institutional  investors  exceeded  200 percent of GDP in 199739.
Investment  Policies.  The investment  policies  of the pension  funds used to be
extremely  conservative  and did not reach the limits of any type  or category  of investment.
Rather  than diversifying  in order  to maximize  both security  and yield, the fund  managers
traditionally  interpreted  managing  finds within  the legal  limits as good pension  fund
management.
However,  over the past decade  or so, pension  funds have steadily  increased  their
equity  investments  as well as their investments  in foreign  securities  (Table  27). Equity
investments  rose from 8 percent in 1987  to 21 percent  in 1996.  This includes  employer
equity,  other domestic  equities  and foreign  equities.  Total  investments  in foreign
securities  have also been  rising and reached 16 percent  of total assets in 1996.
Investments  in real assets,  covering  both equities  and real estate, amounted  to 36 percent
of assets,  up from 19 percent  in 1970.
Compared  with other countries  with large  pension  funds  their holdings  of equities
continue  to be small.  Private  sector  pension  funds, especially  the larger funds, are
reported to have much  higher  proportions  of their assets invested  in equities.  But even
large funds  pursue  more conservative  policies  than would  be justified by the nature of
their liabilities.  As reported  in Robeco  (1997:70),  large  pension  funds  with assets in
excess  of CHF 500  million  intended  to raise  their total equity  allocation  from 27 percent
in 1996  to 35 percent five years  later. As noted in the Robeco  study,  these  proportions  are
quite modest  by comparison  to the patterns  prevailing  in US (50-60  percent)  or UK
pension  funds (70-80  percent).
Insurance  companies  and banks  play a large  part in the management  of pension
fund assets.  As already  noted, insurance  companies  directly  managed  CHF 85 billion  of
pension  fund assets in 1997  as a result of collective  insurance  contracts.  Banks  participate
in the second  pillar  mainly  through  asset management  rather than direct  administration  of
second  pillar  foundations.  They  manage  more than  half of the total second  pillar  assets.
Yet, compared  to the total assets administered  by Swiss banks,  the assets of second  pillar
institutions  are not very important.  Pension fund assets  correspond  to only about
10  percent of the total assets  managed  by Swiss banks.
Investment  Returns.  Given  their conservative  investment  policies,  it is not
surprising  that the investment  returns of Swiss  pension  funds are reported  to be very low
(Table  28). Although  international  comparative  studies  point  to the negative  correlation
39  The other  three  are the Netherlands,  the United  Kingdom,  and  the United States.  It should  be
noted that the ratio of assets  to GDP fluctuates  with  the cyclical  behavior  of both asset  prices and economic
activity.  Nevertheless,  it is a good indicator  of the level of development  of pension funds and institutional
investors.
50between asset restrictions and investment returns (European Commission 1999:64), the
fact that asset limits are not binding suggests that the limits as well as the result reflect
conservative policies.
There are no comprehensive and systematic data on the investment returns of
Swiss pension funds, nor on the interest rates credited on the "notional" individual
retirement accounts that they have to maintain. As already noted, the funds must post a
minimum nominal return of 4 percent but may of course offer a higher rate. This would
be of limited relevance for defined benefit plans, where the investment risk is assumed by
employers, but would be very important for defined contribution plans (as well as for the
calculation of transfer values when workers change employers). Yet no information is
available as to the range of interest rates credited by pension funds.
The aggregate statistical information included in the bi-annual surveys of the
Federal Office of Statistics is based on reported book values and excludes unrealized
capital gains. It is therefore of little reliability and usefulness. Davis (1995:127-157)
estimated the investment returns of Swiss pension funds for the period 1966-1990 by
using asset portfolios and annual total returns on market indices of different instruments
and assuming one-year horizons. This approach assumes that pension funds invest in the
market index for each instrument and abstracts from transaction costs as well as from the
effects of changes in asset allocations within each year. The study found that Swiss
pension funds achieved an average real rate of return between 1967 and 1990 of
1.5 percent per year. With average inflation amounting to 4 percent over this period, this
translates into a nominal return of 5.6 percent. Real returns were much higher in the two
subperiods 1976-80 and 1981-85,  but were negative in the early 1970s and in the late
1980s.
The returns of the Swiss pension funds reported by Davis (1995:150) compared
unfavorably with those achieved by pension funds in the United Kingdom, Germany,
Japan, the Netherlands and Denmark. Rather surprisingly they were not much lower than
those reported for pension funds in Australia, Canada and the United Statese. The weak
performance compared to German and Danish pension funds, which also have a low
exposure in equities, is due to the policy of low real interest rates on bonds and mortgages
pursued by the Swiss authorities over this period. The average real rate of interest on
mortgage loans was 4.7 percent in Germany, 5.8 percent in Denmark and only 1.3 percent
in Switzerland. Similar, if somewhat less pronounced, differences also characterized the
average real returns on other long-term loans and on bonds.
40  The low  average  returns  for US pension  funds,  which  are reported  in  Davis  (1995),  reflect  the
very  poor performance  of US corporations  and the US equity  market  in  the late 1960s  and throughout  the
1970s. Since  the beginning  of the 1980s,  US pension  funds  have reported  very  high  real returns  in line
with  the very  strong  performance  of the US markets.
51Three main reasons  can be offered  for the persistently  low returns  achieved  by
Swiss pension  funds. First, the specified  minimum  return may  have become  the norm  and
encouraged  conservative  policies  that protected  pension  fund managers  from the risk of a
large shortfall  in any particular  year.  Specifying  the minimum  rate as an average
requirement  over the life of an individual  account  could  mitigate  this problem  as negative
returns in any one year could be admissible  as long as the average  compound  rate was no
lower  than the specified  minimum.
Second,  there was probably  little pressure  from the public  for higher  returns.  This
may be because  of the particular  design  of the second  pillar.  At one end of the spectrum,
high-income  workers  covered  by large  company  plans effectively  belong  to defined-
benefit  plans, where  the investment  risk is assumed  by employers.  Moreover,  large
private sector  pension  funds, which  invest  more in equities,  probably  achieved  higher
returns than  those reported  above.  At the other end of the spectrum,  because  of the use of
the concept  of "coordinated  earnings",  low-income  workers,  who are covered  by small
company  plans that tend to operate  defined-contribution  plans, rely only to a limited
extent  (or not at all if their income  is below the stipulated  threshold)  on their private
pension  for their old age. They are thus little affected  by low returns.  Moreover,  such
workers  probably  benefit  from the redistributive  effects  of the public pillar  and have little
reason  to be critical  of the overall  system.  Middle-income  workers  participating  in DC
plans may benefit  from high employer  contributions  and  the use of targeted  replacement
rates.  Whatever  the reason,  there seems  to be little criticism  in Switzerland  of the low
investmnent  returns.
Third,  the use of a minimum  annuity  conversion  factor that appears  to produce  a
reasonably  fair pension  payment  and a satisfactory  replacement  rate  for workers  with
average  or close  to average  earnings  probably  mitigates  any criticism.  As already  noted
above,  the strongest  criticisms  have been  leveled  at the vesting  and portability  rules of
pension  funds rather than  at their low returns.
In Latin  American  countries,  where  pension  fuids operate  like mutual funds,
valuation  rules specify  the method  of measuring  investment  returns and allocating  them
to affiliated  members.  In Switzerland,  where defined  contribution  pension  funds operate
more like "savings  accounts"  or "pooled  endowment  insurance  policies"  than mutual
funds,  the specification  of minimum  interest  credits on "notional"  individual  accounts
appears  to have  obviated  the need for specifying  clear rules on this score.  As discussed
above,  insurance  companies  offer bonuses  if investment  returns  exceed  those that were
used for calculating  the uniform  premiums  for insured  pension  funds. However,  it is not
clear if workers  have a legal right on any returns in excess of the specified  minimum  that
may be earned  either  by insurance  companies  or by self-administered  private  pension
funds.
Swiss private  pension  funds  may effectively  be operated  as cash balance  plans.
These are increasingly  used in the United  States and other  Anglo-American  countries  to
replace  defined-benefit  plans. Cash balance  plans use notional  accounts  and stipulate  an
52annual investment return that is credited to these accounts, while employers assume the
investment risk. They may thus provide some comfort to workers with a low tolerance for
investment risk, but they raise many policy issues relating to potentially weaker
incentives for strong investment performance as well as lack of transparency and
potential conflicts of interest between pension fund sponsors, asset managers, and
covered workers.
Whatever the reasons for the poor investment performance in the past, during the
1990s the returns of Swiss pension funds must have been much higher reflecting the
much stronger performance of equity markets and the capital gains realized in bond
markets (as a result of the persistent fall in interest rates). Between 1990 and 1998 Swiss
equities produced a total nominal return of 22.1 percent per year and a real return of 19.3
percent. Swiss bonds achieved a total return of 3.8 percent and mortgage rates averaged
4.5 percent, both well above the average rate of inflation that amounted to 2.4 percent.
With a growing allocation in equities, the total return of Swiss pension fhnds must have
increased, although it would still be well below that of pension funds in Anglo-American
countries.
Data published in the professional publication Pensions and Investments
(Table 29) show real returns for large Swiss pension funds averaged 12.1 percent between
1995 and 1998. These were much higher than the returns achieved by large Japanese
funds and relatively close to those earned by Australian, UK, US and Canadian funds.
3.13  Operating Costs
As in the case of investment returns, comprehensive data on operating costs are
not readily available. The data published by the Federal Office of Statistics indicate a low
level of costs. Reported administrative costs ranged between 3 and 4 percent of
contributions, with reported asset management costs, but excluding interest payments on
debt, adding another 3 to 4 percent. Total operating costs amounted to between 6 and
8 percent of contributions or between 40 and 50 basis points of average total assets
(Table 30). These numbers are of the same order of magnitude as those reported for UK
and South African pension funds. No infornation  on the cost experience of different
types of finds or even more so on individual pension funds is available.
However, as noted by the Federal Office of Social Insurance (OFAS 1996:56-59),
many employers absorb a substantial part of the administrative costs of the pension funds
they sponsor and thus the total costs may be much higher. But because Swiss pension
funds are sponsored by employers and individual workers have no choice of fund, very
little, if anything, is spent on marketing and on selling commissions to agents. Moreover,
the limited provision of data on the performance of funds may also keep costs down.
However, what matters for employees is not so much the level of costs as the level of net
returns. T,ittle  systematic evidence is available linking costs and net returns for pension
53funds, although competitive markets with pluralistic structures tend to report higher net
returns despite higher operating costs.
3.14  Guarantee  Fund
The Guarantee Fund of the second pillar is a government-created by privately-
managed entity. It is a foundation managed on the basis of private contracts by the
association of cantonal banks and by a private management company. Prior to 1990
pension funds were required to contribute to the Fund 0.2 percent of the coordinated
income on which their revenues are based 4'. In 1990 the fee was lowered to 0.04 percent.
But following increasing outlays, the fee was raised to 0.06 percent in 1997 and further to
0.1 percent in 1998. This increase was necessitated by the growing number of
insolvencies and by the wider responsibilities imposed on the Fund.
The Guarantee Fund provides subsidies to individual funds with an unfavorable
age structure as well as transfers to compensate for insolvency of pension funds. The
Fund also covers the expenses of the Suppletory Institution. Since the implementation of
the new law on portability, it will also provide subsidies to individual funds that face
financial difficulties because of the new rules on vesting and portability. The Guarantee
Fund used to cover only the obligatory minimum benefits. However, following a change
in the law it now extends guarantees to additional benefits up to an insured salary of CHF
108,450.
During recent years, the number of insolvency cases has been increasing rapidly.
From 625 in 1991, they reached 2,288 in 1998. Total expenditure for the insolvency cases
increased from CHF 5.4 million in 1990 to 109.9 million in 1997, representing an
increase from 0.07 to 0.83 percent of annual pension payments. Almost all cases were
due to bankruptcy of the sponsoring employer rather than insolvency of only the fund.
Total reserves of the Guarantee Fund amounted in 1997 to CHF 134 billion, down
from CHF 295 million in 1993. The Fund suffered an annual deficit of CHF 76 million in
1997, which also helps to explain the increase in the fee. The Fund invests 45 percent of
its assets in Swiss bonds, 10 percent in foreign bonds denominated in Swiss Francs,
20 percent in equity, 15 percent in foreign denominated bonds and 10 percent in other
assets. Because of the extension of the guarantee to higher benefits, the Fund now covers
7,500 institutions up from the 3,300 institutions that were covered before.
41  The fee was initially  set at 0.2 percent but this was perceived  to be too high and was lowered  to
0.04 percent in 1990.
543.15  Suppletory Fund
The Suppletory Fund plays a marginal but important role in the Swiss second
pillar. All employers, who fail to establish a separate pension scheme or to join a pooled
foundation, are automatically affiliated with the Suppletory Institution. This fund is a
pension foundation that is jointly established by employers and trade unions. It is
managed by a group of large insurance companies and also enrolls persons applying for
voluntary insurance. It covers about 2500 employees and 1.5 percent of all employers are
registered. The administrative expenses of the Suppletory Fund are covered by the
Guarantee Fund.
3.16  Disclosure and Publicity Standards
Unlike pension funds in Latin American countries, Swiss pension funds are not
subject to extensive rules on disclosure and publicity. The funds are required to produce
annual reports and accounts, which are submitted to their supervisory authorities. They
are also required to inform their affiliates about their individual retirement capital upon
request but at least every three years. They are also required to provide detailed
statements of the transfer capital when workers change employment.
In general, however, the Swiss pension funds provide little information to the
public. The results of the bi-annual surveys undertaken by the Federal Office of Statistics
are published with a two-year delay. They contain very limited information on investrnent
performance and operating costs. They also have no data at all on individual funds.
Although they contain some information on the structure of different types of funds, this
information is of little practical use in the absence of any data on relative performance.
Without extensive research effort, workers have no way of comparing the performance of
their own fund with other funds.
Because pension funds are employer-based and do not compete for affiliates, little
effort and expense are spent on publicity. Marketing campaigns are presumably
undertaken by insurance companies and asset managers in trying to win management
mandates from the pension funds but these are not addressed to the public at large.
The lack of transparency on the structure and performance of Swiss pension funds
is one of the mysteries of the Swiss pension scene, especially when the people voted in a
referendum to make participation in such schemes compulsory. As in the case of
investment returns and operating costs, the public shows little concern about the lack of
transparency. This may be linked to the prevalence of financial secrecy in Switzerland.
As already noted, it may also be explained by the satisfactory overall results that the
present policies have produced. This may relate not only to the performance of pension
funds but also to the overall performance of the economy.
55Another  possible  explanation  is that the Swiss public  appreciates  the benefits  that
the Swiss financial  system  and the Swiss  economy  reap from observing  strict rules of
financial  secrecy  as it applies  to foreigners.  And it may also realize  that it would  be
difficult  to insist on complete  transparency  on the operation  of financial  institutions  for
residents  but maintain  extensive  secrecy  for foreigners.  A practical  compromise  would  be
to avoid calls  for greater transparency  but to rely on the supervisory  authorities  and
financial  experts  to ensure  that pension  funds are managed  prudently  and guarantee  the
promised  benefits  in cases  of misuse or misappropriation  of funds.  Of course,  it would  be
very difficult  to prove  or disprove  such  conjecture.  However,  the benefits  of acting as a
financial  heaven  have declined  in recent  years.  This is both because  foreign  financial
centers  have become  more liberal and because  there is now greater  emphasis  on fighting
corruption  and money  laundering.  Coupled  with growing  pressures  for better
performance  it would  seem  highly likely  that calls for greater  financial  transparency
would  become  louder and more  persistent  in the future.
3.17  Supervision
Pension funds are supervised by the authorities with which they must register.
These range from cantonal supervision agencies for funds operating within the borders of
individual cantons to the Federal Office of Social Insurance for funds covering employees
of national or international companies and the Ministry of Finance for confederational
entities.  Life insurance  companies,  which undertake  the management  of pension  funds
under collective insurance contracts, fall under the supervision of the Federal Office for
Private Insurance.
The fragmented supervision gives rise to differences in supervisory practice,
especially between the cantonal and national level. However, of greater practical
relevance is the reliance of supervisory authorities on external auditors and certified
pension experts for ensuring that pension funds comply with the rules and maintain
appropriate records and accounts. Switzerland is one of the first countries that have
imposed a legal obligation on auditors and other experts of financial institutions, be they
banks, insurance companies or pension funds, to report to the supervisory authorities any
infraction of the rules by the supervised institutions and any developments that require
immediate intervention. Auditors and other experts are also required to notify the
supervisory agency if their contract is terminated.
Pension  funds are required  to be audited annually.  If the fund is part of a pooled
foundation,  the administering  insurance  company  and bank must be examined  as well.
The Federal Office of Social Insurance can issue inspection guidelines to the supervising
authority. In general, however, supervision instructions are not very specific. All pension
funds are required to appoint certified pension fund experts, who assist the sponsoring
firm in the establishment of the pension fund and in accounting and actuarial calculations.
Actuarial analyses of the pension funds are to be conducted every 3 to 5 years. There are
no set guidelines with respect to the actuarial assumptions to be made for such analyses.
56The individual pension experts determine the assumptions for wage and liability
projections at their discretion.
The pension fund supervisory authorities undertake little off-site surveillance of
individual funds and perform limited analyses of the submitted financial returns. They
also rely on external experts for detailed on-site inspections and forensic investigations.
The task of the supervisory authorities is made more difficult by the fact that pension
funds are not required to submit regular quarterly returns in electronic form, but only
have to provide annual written reports several months after the end of the calendar year.
Any sharp deterioration in the financial position of individual pension funds is unlikely to
become known before the passage of between six and eighteen months.
Despite the operation of a Guarantee Fund, supervision is reactive rather than
proactive and does not appear to address potential "moral hazard" problems in an
effective way. The situation is made worse by the fact that pension funds are allowed to
deviate from the prescribed asset allocation rules if they can provide adequate
justification on an ex post basis. Departures from accepted prudent practice are more
pronounced among smaller pension funds, which are the least able to bear the higher risks
of such deviations. As pension funds are now allowed to invest in more volatile assets,
such as precious metals and financial derivatives, there is an increased risk that sudden
large losses may be incurred but remain undetected for a long period of time. The absence
of effective internal or external custodial requirements also allows scope for
misappropriation or misuse of pension fund assets by dishonest or unscrupulous
employers and fund managers. Recent years have witnessed a growing number of cases
of malpractice, although both their frequency and the total losses suffered are still on the
low side.
Pension funds are also allowed to self-insure the mortality and interest rate
reinvestment risk for the fixed annuity payments into which accurnulated capital must be
converted. Very small pension funds, those with fewer than 100 affiliates, are required to
take special measures on the advice of their certified expert but larger funds are free to
determine their own approach. In practice, insurance companies probably insure most of
the fixed annuities offered by small and medium-size pension institutions. However,
neither the insurance companies nor the pension funds that self-insure are required to
undertake periodic dynamic solvency tests (DSTs). These are used in Canada and
increasingly other countries such as Australia, Singapore and the United Kingdom, to
assess the impact of large and persistent falls in equity prices and/or interest rates on the
financial situation of insurance companies and pension institutions.
The large fall of Swiss and European interest rates in the 1  990s is already causing
concern among insurance companies and pension funds in Denmark, Spain, Switzerland
and the United Kingdom. In Switzerland the insurance supervisory authorities have
approved a decline in the technical rate used by insurance companies for their voluntary
policies from 3.5 to 2.5 percent (OFAP 1998:E17-18). However, both the minimum
interest rate for retirement accounts and the minimum annuity conversion factor have
57remained unchanged. Lowering these rates may not be warranted at this juncture, since
they are deemed to be long-term rates, and since both insurance companies and pension
institutions have strong capital positions. But applying a dynamic solvency test and
taking necessary measures to ensure the long-term solvency of insurance companies and
pension funds would appear essential.
The Swiss authorities are also introducing new mortality tables that are based on
cohort mortality data rather than mortality data at any particular point in time. This is a
move in the right direction. Cohort tables are introduced at first for the voluntary life and
annuity business of insurance companies. However, they should also be developed for
compulsory annuities, which may experience different mortality patterns. The new
mortality data and more sophisticated financial data should be used for assessing the
solvency of both insurance companies and uninsured pension funds.
3.18  Future  Prospects
The second pillar has grown to become a very large system in terms of both
affiliates and financial assets. Its futLre prospects are therefore less likely to be associated
with further massive growth but rather with major improvements in performance. The
system faces a major challenge in strengthening supervision and enhancing transparency.
Both of these appear to suffer because of the fragmentation of its structure and the
presence of a large number of very srnall institutions. A consolidation process may be
necessary for this and acceleration of recent trends may be appropriate.
In terms of transparency, more frequent and regular reporting of the performance
of individual institutions as well as the whole pillar would be warranted. This would
inform individual workers and would allow them to exert more effective pressure for
improved performance.
The second, equally important, challenge is to improve its investment
performance. Pressures for a further relaxation of investment rules are likely to increase
and to lead to better performance. There may also be growing pressures for giving
employees greater choice in selecting pension funds and in directing their investments.
Switzerland may need to follow in the steps of the United States, Australia, Canada and
other countries in offering multiple choice of funds within particular pension plans. At
present, many large funds are considering the pros and cons of adopting more flexible
structures.
Given its record of innovation, Switzerland could be the first country to
contemplate seriously the creation of a dual regulatory structure, comprising a heavily
regulated part with strong government guarantees that caters for those with low risk
58tolerance  and a less regulated  part with strong  conduct  rules but fewer  state  guarantees  for
those  seeking  a higher  return 42.
Another  major issue  is the development  of a more sophisticated  market  for
annuities.  The current  compulsory  annuitization  on the basis of a uniform  type of annuity
may  need  to be replaced  by a more  flexible  system.  In this, compulsory  annuitization
with a standard  annuity  product  could  be limited  to attaining  a reasonable  overall
replacement  rate, while  any additional  balances  could  be linked  either  to variable
annuities  or to scheduled  withdrawals.
42  A dual regulatory  structure  is proposed  in Vittas  (1998:9).
59IV.  THE THIRD PILLAR
4.1  Overview
The Swiss pension system is a multi-pillar system that comprises 3 basic pillars.
However, each pillar is sub-divided into 2 important components and thus it could be
argued that the system consists of six pillars. The first pillar covers the ordinary and
supplementary benefits. The second pillar covers in practice both the compulsory and the
voluntary group (employer-sponsored) benefits. In many cases, the same pension
institution offers both types of benefits, while in other cases separate institutions are'
created. The third pillar covers individual savings and also consists of two parts: pillar 3a,
which covers all tied savings that benefit from tax incentives and are linked to retirement
saving; and pillar 3b, which does not benefit from tax incentives and can be used freely.
4.2  Institutional Structure
Free savings can be maintained with all financial institutions in Switzerland, and
presumably overseas, and they can also take the form of houses or other assets, including
ownership of unlisted companies. Bwt tied savings that benefit from tax incentives can
only be held with insurance companies and specially authorized banking foundations that
operate in Switzerland. The banking foundations are special institutions that are created
by banks to operate such accounts. Tied savings must be covered by special retirement
contracts. Although the law does not specifically allow the participation of mutual funds,
it is possible for tied retirement savings to be invested in mutual funds if the latter are
operated by insurance companies or banks.
4.3  Coverage, Contributions and Tax Treatment
Participation in the tied retireinent savings plans is open to both employees and
self-employed people. Contributions are deductible from their taxable income for all
direct income taxes imposed by the Confederation, the cantons, and local communities.
Both spouses, if they engage in an economic activity and have earnings, may participate
and benefit from these tax incentives. Tax-deductible contributions are allowed as
follows:
For people who are already covered by a second pillar plan, up to 8 percent per
year of the upper limit set on "'coordinated earnings" used by the second pillar. In
1999, the upper limit was equal to CHF 72,360 and the limit for tied savings
amounted to CHF 5,789 per year. It is interesting that this limit is not linked to the
earnings of the contributor and thus low-income people can benefit
proportionately more than high-income ones from this tax incentive.
60*  For people  who are not covered  by a second  pillar  institution,  up to 20 percent  of
their earnings  but subject  to a limit that is equal to 40 percent  of the upper limit
set  on "coordinated  earnings"  used by the second  pillar.  In 1999,  this amounted  to
CHF 28,944.
4.4  Benefits
Benefits  are paid on retirement  or on disability  or death.  Unlike  the benefits  of the
second  pillar  which have  in most cases  to take  the form of a life annuity  (and are
therefore  not inheritable),  the benefits from a tied savings  account  can take the form of an
annuity  or a capital  payment.  They are inherited  by the surviving  spouse  and children
irrespective  of age and any other  relatives  or beneficiaries  nominated  by the account
holder.
Benefits  can be paid at the earliest  5 years  before  the normal  retirement  age
stipulated  in the public  pillar.  Exceptions  are made in cases  of invalidity,  for the payment
of an additional  transfer  capital  if the account  holder  joins a second  pillar institution  or
transfers  to another  second  pillar institution,  for the purchase  of housing  or the repayment
of a mortgage  loan.
4.5  Performance
It is difficult  to assess  the performance  of the third pillar  because  there are no
readily  available  statistics  on the use of pillar  3a facilities  or on the totality  of pillar 3b
savings.  Available  data on insurance  companies  indicate  the use of individual  life policies
and individual  voluntary  annuities  and these  can be contrasted  with data on group
business.  However,  the data are far from comprehensive.
In insurance,  premiums  from group business  increased  tenfold  between 1950  and
1998  in relation  to GDP,  whereas  total premiums  rose only fourfold  (Table 31).  In 1998,
group  business  accounted  for 52 percent  of all premiums,  individual  life policies  for 35
percent,  and individual  annuities  for 7 percent.
With regard  to mathematical  reserves,  group business  accounted  for 53 percent  of
total reserves  in 1998  when it amounted  to CHF 93 billion or 24 percent  of GDP. These
reserves  represent  the accumulated  funds  the insured  pension  institutions  hand over to
insurance  companies.  As already  noted,  they are additional  to the funds  reported  by
pension  institutions.  The reserves  for individual  life policies  were equivalent  to 16
percent  of GDP and those  for individual  annuities  to 4 percent  of GDP  (Table  32).
61The above  data show  that both individual  life policies  and especially  individual
annuities  are a very small part of the total business  of insurance  companies.  Very little
information  is provided  on the composition  of individual  business  between  the tied (pillar
3a) and free (pillar  3b) components.  Some  published  data on insured values suggest  that
free life policies  account  for two-thirds  of all individual  life policies,  while free annuity
policies  represent  nine-tenths  of all individual  annuities.  These  data suggest  that tied
business  is relatively  small.  Nevertheless,  applying  these  percentages  to the annual
volume  of premiums,  tied business  may generate  about CHF 4 billion in annual
contributions  to insurance  companies.  These  would compare  with CHF 24 billion  for total
second  pillar  contributions  and CHF 19 billion  for employer  and employee  first pillar
contributions.  Thus, tied third pillar  contributions  would  represent  8.5 percent  of total
annual  contributions.  However,  the tied contributions  that are made to banking
foundations  are excluded  from this calculation.
No data are available  on the investment  returns  on tied savings.  The published
data on the overall  investment  performance  of life insurance  companies  follow  the usual
extremely  conservative  accounting  policies  and are thus highly unsatisfactory.  They
create  huge hidden  reserves  and distort investment  policies  toward  poorly  performing
assets.  The published  data on the allocation  of the worldwide  assets of life insurance
companies  show  a strong  preference  for debt instruments,  with only a very recent change
of trend  in favor  of equities  (Table  33).  Although  no separate  data are published  on the
assets that pertain  to domestic  business,  it appears  from data on mathematical  reserves
that domestic  business  represented  80 percent  of worldwide  business  in 1998.
62ANNEX I
HISTORICAL  PERSPECTIVE
The evolution of social security in Switzerland was strongly influenced by the
political structure and the economic development of the country. The Swiss federal
structure gives strong legislative powers to the 26 cantons and requires constitutional
amendments for the creation of centrally applicable laws, such as the establishment of
compulsory social security institutions.  The population participates directly in the
legislative process through plebiscites. 43
The Public Pillar. In the case of social security, the use of plebiscites led to
considerable delays due to popular rejection of several proposals to establish federal
compulsory schemes. Also, Switzerland did not experience the rise of urban pauperism
during the process of industrialization that accelerated the need for social protection in
other industrialized countries.  Private initiatives and mutual associations developed as
the main pillars of social protection around the middle of the 19th century.
The constitutional basis for the introduction of a health and accident insurance
scheme was laid as early as 1890. The respective Act, however, was rejected by popular
vote and adopted only in a second attempt in 1911. The canton of Glaris introduced a
compulsory old age insurance scheme for all its residents in 1904 (Helbling 1991:27).
This is regarded as the precursor of the Swiss pension scheme.
In December 1925, two new constitutional articles (34 quater and 41 ter), which
empowered the Confederation to introduce old age and survivors insurance, were
accepted by popular vote and by the cantons.  The scheme was to be financed by taxes on
tobacco and distilled beverages, but the draft Act was rejected in a referendum held in
December 1931. The beginning of the Great Depression could have contributed to this
outcome of the vote. Economic hardship and widespread unemployment did not seem to
justify the introduction of benefits only for the elderly.  As economic and political
insecurity increased, no further attempts to introduce social security were made.
At the beginning of World War II, a scheme for the payment of daily allowances
for loss of earnings due to military service was established by an emergency Act of
Parliament. This scheme paid benefits to servicemen and their families, was contributory
43  There  are several  types of plebiscites. Compulsory  referenda,  organized  by the federal
government,  are required  for constitutional  amendments.  In addition,  citizens  objecting  to the introduction
of a new law may  organize  a referendum  if they collect  50,000  signatures  within a period of 3 months  with
a view  to preventing  its acceptance.  But citizens  may  also organize  plebiscites,  called  initiatives,
petitioning  for changes  in legislation  if they collect 100,000  signatures  within  a period  of 18  months.
Referenda  and  initiatives  play  an important  and active  part in the political  life of Switzerland.
63(4% of incomes), and was based on equalization funds across cantons.  It was so
successful that it paved the way for the introduction of general pension insurance. The
Federal Council prepared a new draft;  act in 1946 that was adopted by Parliament in
December 1946 and was then submitted to a popular referendum in July 1947. The result
was 80% in favor (860,000 for and 215,000 against) and the system of old age and
survivors' insurance came finally into operation in January 1948 (Charles 1993:13-14).
Disability insurance, however, was not established until 1960.
Swiss social security experts emphasize the concept of total solidarity on which
the first pillar is based.  This covers solidarity between the generations, income groups,
sexes, single and married people, regions, and urban and rural areas (Charles
1993:13-14). The main features and principles of the first pillar as a social insurance
scheme based on this concept of intergenerational and social solidarity have remained
unchanged despite 10 revisions of the Act."  The first 8 of the revisions legislated benefit
improvements.  During the 1970s, pension levels and contribution rates almost doubled
as a consequence of the 8th revision. The 9th and 10th revisions then dealt with fiscal
consolidation through expenditure reductions and revenue increases as well as correcting
some imbalances, such as splitting pension rights for married couples and providing
better protection to divorced women. ][n  this context, some important changes with regard
to the solidarity between sexes and between single and married people were effected in
1997 (see below).
The Private Pillar. The late introduction of the first pillar was partly due to the
early development and rapidly increasing importance of voluntary occupational pension
schemes, which reduced the political pressure for a comprehensive public pension
scheme. As already noted, occupational pension funds probably covered one-third of all
workers in the 1940s when they had assets corresponding to 30% of GDP.  Coverage
expanded to two-thirds of all workers in the early 1970s with accumulated financial
assets amounting to 40% of GDP.  Bul despite the expansion of coverage the Swiss
people voted in a referendum in December 1972 to change the Federal Constitution to
make occupational pension plans compulsory.
An interesting historical question is why did the Swiss people vote for a
compulsory occupational pillar when coverage of voluntary schemes was quite extensive,
while most of those not covered by them received public pensions that ensured
reasonably high replacement rates.  Helbling suggests that this was a defensive measure
against a major expansion of the public pillar (Helbling 1991:29).
Initially, the public pillar offered modest benefits that were linked to years of
contribution.  But the first 8 revisions involved increases in benefits, mirroring the trends
in social security provision throughout Continental Europe, if not throughout all OECD
44  In addition,  3 adjustment  revisions  were necessary  to keep  benefits  in line  with increases  in the
cost  of living. In 1979,  automatic  adjustment  to a composite  index,  calculated  as the arithmetic  mean  of
the increase  of prices  and wages,  was introduced.
64countries. The promulgation of the merits of the multi-pillar system in 1963 was
probably the first attempt to articulate a defense against a relentless expansion of the
public pillar.  Then, in 1966, a conservative coalition led by the Confederation of
Christian Trade Unions started to organize an initiative for making the second pillar
compulsory. This was rejected in a vote in 1968. In 1969 the federal government
established a commission of experts that recommended the creation of a compulsory
second pillar.  But in the same year the Labor Party of Switzerland started to organize an
initiative favoring the nationalization of all pension schemes covering workers in
dependent employment and their amalgamation in a much expanded public pillar.  In
1972, the Labor Party initiative was rejected, while a government organized referendum
for a constitutional amendment for a compulsory occupational pillar was approved.
The constitutional amendment empowered the Confederation to mandate all
employers to "insure their employees with a company, administration or association
provident fund or a similar institution, and to pay at least half of the contributions".  The
objective of this employer mandate was to "allow elderly, survivors and disabled persons
to maintain their previous standard of living in an appropriate measure, taking into
account the benefits received from the federal insurance" (Article 34quater 3 of the
Federal Constitution - as translated in Charles 1993:11).
Simultaneously, provisions for the transition to a social security system
performing the above functions were adopted.  Article 11 of the constitution obliges the
Confederation and cantons to finance supplementary benefits as long as the first pillar is
not providing full coverage of essential needs; such benefits may be financed both from
general taxes and contribution revenues of the first pillar.  It further regulates the
treatment of the entry generation in the second pillar in order to ensure at least the legal
minimum protection of this group.
T  hus, in 1972, the three-pillar concept - public, occupational and personal - was
laid down in the Swiss constitution. However, the referendum did not specify in detail
the design of the second pillar.  After some delay because of the economic effects of the
oil crisis, the National Council (Lower House) adopted in 1977 a draft bill proposing a
compulsory pillar based on defined benefit plans.  This was deemed too ambitious and
following a report by a committee of experts, the State Council (upper house) adopted in
1980 a draft bill that was less ambitious and closer to prevailing practice. After a period
of consultations to eliminate differences between the two draft bills, the law for the
compulsory occupational pension plans was adopted in 1982 by the two legislative
bodies. To avoid any further delays, this law was not submitted to another referendum.
The preparation of implementing regulations was completed in the ensuing two years and
the new law became effective in January 1985.
The three pillar structure has continued, however, to come under political
pressure. In May 1991, the Social Democratic Party and the Association of Trade Unions
in Switzerland submitted a legislative initiative to raise the pension levels in the first
65pillar and reduce  contribution  obligations  in the second  pillar accordingly.  The initiative
was endorsed  by a sufficient  number  of voters but was rejected  in a 1995  referendum.
Because  of the financial  impact  on both pillars  of the progressive  aging of the
population,  the changing  employment  patterns,  the low investment  returns  of the second
pillar, and the implications  for annuity  policies  of long-term  trends in financial  markets,
the Swiss  authorities  are involved  in a more or less continuous  review  of the structure  of
the pension  system  and are considering  various  proposals  that address  these issues.
Further  changes  in the provisions  and structure  of the system are a certainty,  even  if the




Coverage:  Contributors,  Labor Force  and Economically  Active  Population  (EAP)
(million  people)
Contributors Labor  Force  2/3 (/o)  EAP  2/5 (%)
1950  2.16  2.30  93.9  2.65  81.5
1960  2.73  2.72  100.4  3.13  87.2
1970  3.16  3.14  100.6  3.59  88.0
1980  3.25  3.17  102.5  3.61  90.0
1990  3.77  3.82  98.7  4.07  92.6
1995  3.78  3.80  99.5  4.25  88.9
1996  3.82  3.81  100.3  4.25  89.9
1997  3.80  3.80  100.0  4.25  89.4
1998  3.80  3.85  98.7  4.29  88.6
Source:  Federal  Office  of Social  Insurance
Table  2
Impact  of New Benefit  Formula
Salary  Annual  Old  Pension  New  Pension
Level  Salary  Formula  Rate  Forrnula  Rate
20%  11880  11940  100.5  11940  100.5
40%  23760  14304  60.2  15013  63.2
50%  29700  15492  52.2  16558  55.7
60%  35640  16680  46.8  18102  50.8
100%  59400  21432  36.1  21922  36.9
120%  71280  23880  33.5  23822  33.4
150%  89100  23880  26.8  23880  26.8
200%  118800  23880  20.1  23880  20.1
500%  297000  23880  8.0  23880  8.0
Source:  Federal Office  of Social  Insurance
67Table 3
Number  of Beneficiaries
(million people)
Contri-  Old Age  Survivor  Disabilit  Total
butors  Pensions  Pensions  y  Pensions
Pensions
1950  2.16  0.23  0.08  --  0.31
1960  2.73  0.55  0.13  0.04  0.72
1970  3.16  0.88  0.12  0.10  1.10
1980  3.25  1.03  0.13  0.12  1.27
1990  3.77  1.23  0.12  0.16  1.51
1995  3.78  1.36  0.11  0.20  1.57
1996  3.82  1.39  0.11  0.21  1.71
1997  3.80  1.42  0.11  0.22  1.75
1998  3.80  1.45  0.12  0.22  1.79
Source:  Federal  Office  of Social  Insurance
Table 4
System  and Demographic  Dependency  Ratios
(%)
SDR  DDR
Total  Old-Age  Old-Age
Beneficiarie  Pensions  Ratio
s
1950  14  11  23
1960  26  20
1970  35  28
1980  39  32
1990  40  33
1995  44  36
1996  45  36
1997  46  37
1998  47  38  28
Source:  Federal  Office of Social  Insurance
68Table 5
Contribution Rates for Old Age and Survivors Scheme
Employed  Self-  Nonworking
Employed  CBF/year
1948  4.0%  4.0%  12-600
1969  5.2%  4.6%  40-2000
1973  7.8%  6.8%  78-7800
1975  8.4%  7.3%  84-8400
1979  8.4%  7.8%  168-8400
1982  8.4%  7.8%  210-8400
1986  8.4%  7.8%  252-8400
1990  8.4%  7.8%  269-8400
1992  8.4%  7.8%  299-8400
1996  8.4%  7.8%  324-8400
Source:  Federal  Office of Social  Insurance
Table 6
Contribution Rates for Disability Insurance
(% of income)
Employed  Self-  Non-working
Employed  CHF/year
1960  0.4%  0.4%  1.2-60
1968  0.5%  0.5%  1.8-75
1969  0.6%  0.6%  5.6-261
1973  0.8%  0.8%  8-800
1975  1.0%  1.0%  10-1000
1979  1.0%  1.0%  20-1000
1982  1.0%  1.0%  25-1000
1986  1.0%  1.0%  30-1000
1988  1.2%  1.2%  36-1200
1990  1.2%  1.2%  39-1200
1992  1.2%  1.2%  43-1200
1995  1.4%  1.4%  50-1400
1996  1.4%  1.4%  54-1400
Source:  Federal  Office  of Social  Insurance
Table 7
Single Old Age Pension Replacement Rates
Pensioners  (in %)  Replacement  Rates (in %)
7  100 and more
9  60-  100
23  40 - 60
29  33 - 40
31  33andless
Source:  Federal Office  of Social Insurance
69Table 8
Revenues of Old Age and Survivors Scheme (% GDP)
Contributions  Government  Other  Total
1950  2.35  0.82  0.10  3.25
1960  2.14  0.43  0.43  2.99
1970  2.81  0.65  0.32  3.78
1980  4.79  1.07  0.19  6.05
1990  5.05  1.16  0.21  6.42
1995  5.13  1.32  0.29  6.82
1996  5.13  1.36  0.30  6.78
1997  5.00  1.39  0.40  6.79
1998  4.97  1.40  0.26  6.62
Source: Federal Office of Social Insurance
Table 9
Expenses of Old Age and Survivors Scheme (% GDP)
Old-Age  Admin  Total  Annual
Benefits  Expenses  Payments  Balance
1950  0.82  0.03  0.85  2.42
1960  1.90  0.03  1.93  1.07
1970  3.29  0.02  3.31  0.48
1980  5.87  0.03  5.90  0.15
1990  5.76  0.02  5.78  0.64
1995  6.72  0.02  6.75  0.00
1996  6.76  0.02  6.78  -0.01
1997  6.92  0.02  6.94  -0.16
1998  6.96  0.03  6.99  -0.37
Source: Federal Office of Social Insurance
Table 10
Capital Fund of Old Age and Survivors Scheme
Total  Capital  CF/TB  CF/GDP
Benefits  Fund
(CHF  bn)  (CHF  bn)  %  %
1950  0.16  1.40  875.00  7.15
1960  0.71  5.61  790.14  15.01
1970  2.98  8.55  286.91  9.43
1980  10.58  9.69  91.59  5.38
1990  18.27  18.16  99.40  5.72
1995  24.42  23.84  97.62  6.56
1996  24.74  23.81  96.24  6.51
1997  25.72  23.22  90.28  6.25
1998  26.62  21.83  82.01  5.71
Source: Federal Office of Social Insurance
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Revenues of Disability Insurance Scheme (% GDP)
Contributions  Government  Other  Total
1960  0.21  0.08  0.00  0.29
1970  0.33  0.33  0.00  0.66
1980  0.58  0.59  0.00  1.17
1990  0.73  0.65  0.01  1.39
1995  0.86  0.91  0.02  1.78
1996  0.86  1.00  0.02  1.88
1997  0.84  1.03  0.02  1.89
1998  0.83  1.04  0.03  1.90
Source: Federal Office of Social Insurance
Table 12
Expenses of Disability Insurance Scheme (% GDP)
Disability  Admin  Other  Total  Annual
Benefits  Expenses  Expenses  Payments  Balance
1960  0.13  0.01  0.00  0.14  0.15
1970  0.63  0.02  0.00  0.65  0.01
1980  1.15  0.03  0.01  1.20  -0.03
1990  1.26  0.04  0.00  1.30  0.09
1995  1.81  0.06  0.02  1.88  -0.10
1996  1.92  0.06  0.02  2.00  -0.12
1997  1.99  0.04  0.03  2.06  -0.16
1998  2.02  0.06  0.01  2.08  -0.18
Source:  Federal  Office  of Social  Insurance
Table 13
Capital Fund of Disability Insurance Scheme
Total  Capital  CF/TB  CF/GDP
Benefits  Fund
(CHF bn)  (CHF bn)  %  %
1960  0.05  0.05  100.00  0.13
1970  0.57  0.08  14.04  0.09
1980  2.08  -0.36  -17.31  -0.20
1990  3.99  0.01  0.25  0.00
1995  6.57  -1.15  -17.50  -0.32
1996  7.01  -1.58  -22.54  -0.43
1997  7.39  -2.19  -29.63  -0.59
1998  7.71  -0.69  -8.95  -0.18
Source: Federal  Office  of Social  Insurance
71Table 14
Pension  Institutions  by Legal Status,  1996
Funds  %  Affiliates  %
(number)  (million)
Public Sector Institutions  168  1.5  0.56  17.8
Cooperative Societies  39  0.3  0.10  3.2
Foundations  11365  98.2  2.49  79.0
Total  11572  100.0  3.15  100.0
Source:  Pension  Fund  Statistics,  Federal  Office  of  Statistics
Table 15
Evolution  of Funds,  Affiliates  and Beneficiaries,  1970-1997
Funds  Affiliates  Beneficiaries  B/A
(number)  (million)  (million)  (%/0)
1970  15581  1.28  0.22  17.2
1978  17060  1.58  0.31  19.6
1980  17500  1.69  0.33  19.5
1987  15179  3.27  0.42  12.8
1990  n.a.  3.54  0.51  14.4
1992  13689  3.43  0.53  15.5
1994  12851  3.24  0.61  18.8
1995  12200  3.19  0.63  19.7
1996  11572  3.15  0.65  20.6
1997  n.a.  3.10  0.67  21.6
Source:  Pension  Fund  Statistics,  Federal  Office  of  Statistics
Table 16
Pension  Institutions  with and without  Affiliates,  1996
Funds  %  Affiliates  %
(number)  (million)
Registered with Affiliates  3075  26.6  2.91  92.4
Non-Registered with Affiliates  1210  10.4  0.24  7.6
Total with Affiliates  4285  37.0
Charitable Institutions  4586  39.6
Financing Foundations  221  1.9
"Frozen" Institutions  2480  21.4
Total NR w/o Affiliates  7287  63.0
Total  11572  100.0  3.15  100.0
Source:  Pension  Fund  Statistics,  Federal  Office  of Statistics
72Table  17
Pension Funds  by Number  of Affiliates, 1987 and  1996
1987  1996
Funds  Affiliates  Funds  Affiliates
Affiliates  per fund  %  %  %  %
1-99  74.8  4.9  57.5  2.5
100-499  18.3  10.7  29.5  9.2
500-999  3.0  5.8  5.7  5.4
1000-4999  2.8  16.8  5.3  15.2
5000-9999  0.4  8.0  0.9  8.6
10000+  0.6  53.8  1.2  59.0
Total  100.0  100.0  100.0  100.0
Funds  (#) and affiliates  (million)  8840  3.27  4285  3.15
Source: Pension Fund Statistics, Federal Office of Statistics
Table  18
Funds  and Affiliates by Risk Management  Type, 1970, 1987 and  1996
1970  1987  1996
Funds  Affiliates Funds  Affiliates Funds  Affiliates
Autonomous  (w/o reinsurance)  8.6  51.9  12.9  38.4  14.2  35.9
Autonomous  (with  reinsurance)  0.0  0.0  5.3  3.7  12.5  10.2
Semi-autonomous  29.8  21.2  40.7  21.1  44.6  15.9
Insured  61.6  26.9  38.2  35.9  25.1  37.0
Savings  Funds  0.0  0.0  2.9  0.9  3.6  1.0
Total Funds  with  Affiliates  100.0  100.0  100.0  100.0*  100.0  100.0
Funds  (#) and Affiliates  (million)  13643  1.28  6151  3.16*  4285  3.15
* excludes "frozen" institutions and their affiliates
Source: Pension Fund Statistics, Federal Office of Statistics
Table  19
Types of Pension Plans,  1987 and  1996
1987  1996
Funds  Affiliates  Funds  Affiliates
Defined  benefit  13  32  18  29
Defined  contribution  84  57  80  70
Other  3  11  2  1
Total  100  100  100  100
Funds  (#) and  affiliates  (million)  8427  3.25  4285  3.15
Source: Pension Fund Statistics, Federal Office of Statistics
73Table 20
Second Pillar  Coverage  and Labor  Force
Affiliates  Labor  Force  A/LF
(million)  (million)  %
1970  :1.28  3.14  40.8
1978  1.58  3.06  51.6
1980  1.69  3.17  53.3
1987  3.27  3.52  92.9
1990  3.54  3.82  92.7
1992  3.43  3.83  89.6
1994  3.24  3.79  85.5
1995  3.19  3.80  83.9
1996  3.15  3.81  82.7
1997  3.10  3.80  81.6
Source: Pension Fund Statistics, Federal Office of Statistics and
Federal Office of Social Insurance
Table 21
Second Pillar Beneficiaries
Old Age  Other  Total  Beneficiaries/  Old  Age Pensions/
Pensions  Pensions  Pensions  Affiliates  Old  Age People
(million)  (million)  (million)  %  %
1970  n.a.  n.a.  0.22  17.2  n.a.
1978  n.a.  n.a.  0.31  19.6  n.a.
1980  n.a.  n.a.  0.33  19.5  n.a.
1987  n.a.  n.a.  0.42  12.8  n.a.
1990  n.a.  n.a.  0.51  14.4  n.a.
1992  0.31  0.22  0.53  15.5  27.9
1994  0.33  0.28  0.61  18.8  29.2
1995  n.a.  n.a.  0.63  19.7  n.a.
1996  0.35  0.30  0.65  20.6  30.2
1997  n.a.  n.a.  0.67  21.6  n.a.
Source: Pension Fund Slatistics, Federal Office of Statistics and
Federal Office of Social Insurance
74Table 22
Evolution of Contributions, 1970-1997
Employees  Employers  Total  Employer  GDP
Share  Ratio
(CHF billion) (CHF billion) (CHF  billion)  %  %
1970  1.22  2.24  3.46  64.7  3.8
1978  2.42  4.41  6.83  64.6  4.5
1980  3.53  6.15  9.68  63.5  5.4
1987  5.73  9.39  15.12  62.1  5.9
1990  7.70  13.16  20.86  63.1  6.6
1992  8.54  14.91  23.45  63.6  6.8
1994  8.70  14.44  23.14  62.4  6.5
1995  8.95  15.18  24.13  62.9  6.6
1996  9.05  15.66  24.71  63.4  6.8
1997  9.00  15.20  24.20  62.8  6.5
Source: Pension Fund Statistics, Federal Office of Statistics
Federal Office of Social Insurance
Table 23
Evolution of Benefits, 1970-1997
Benefits  Total  Share of  GDP
Pensions  Lump Sums  Benefits  Pensions  Ratio
(CHF billion)  (CHF billion)  (CHF billion)  %  %
1970  1.16  0.16  1.32  87.9  1.5
1978  2.56  0.42  2.98  85.9  2.0
1980  2.96  0.50  3.46  85.5  1.9
1987  5.50  0.95  6.45  85.3  2.5
1990  7.25  1.49  8.74  83.0  2.8
1992  9.00  1.83  10.83  83.1  3.2
1994  10.70  2.32  13.02  82.2  3.6
1995  11.57  2.57  14.14  81.8  3.9
1996  12.51  2.84  15.35  81.5  4.2
1997  13.20  3.00  16.20  81.5  4.4
Source: Pension Fund Statistics, Federal Office of Statistics
Federal Office of Social Insurance
75Table 24
Age-Related Credits to "Notional" Individual Retirement Accounts
Age  Annual  Credit  Accumulated  Credits
Men  Women  Rate  Men  Women
25-34  25-31  7 %  70 %  49%
35-44  32-41  10%  170  %  149%
45-54  42-51  15 %  320  %  299%
55-64  52-61  18%  500  %  479%
Note: The annual credit rate and accumulated credits are expressed as a percentage of
coordinated earnings.
Source: Federal Office of Social Insurance
Table 25
Allocation of Contribution Revenues between Old Age and Supplementary Benefits
(percent of covered earnings)
Age  Old Age  Other  Total
Men  Women  Benefits  Benefits  Rate
25-34  25-31  7 %  11  %  18%
35-44  32-41  10%  8 %  18%
45-54  42-51  15  %  3 %  18%





Type  of Asset  Asset  Class  Issuer
Domestic  Assets
Debt Instruments  100  15*
Mortgages*  75
Real  Estate  50
Shares  30  10
Claims  on Employers
Guaranteed  Claims  100
Non-Guaranteed  Claims  20
Equities***  10
Foreign  Assets
CHF Bonds  30  5
Foreign  Currency  Bonds  20  5
Real Estate  5
Equities  25  5
Global  Limits****
All equities  and real  estate  70
Domestic  and foreign  equities  50
Foreign  bonds  30
Foreign  currency  securities  30
*  except  for claims  on the federal  and cantonal  governments  as well  as banks  and insurance
companies.
*  *  Up to 80 percent  of the market  value of the mortgaged  asset.
***  Investments in unlisted equities are not authorized.
****  Investments  in  precious  metals  have  been formally  allowed  since  1989  and in derivatives  since
1993.  Use of derivatives  is only  permitted  for hedging  purposes.  Using  derivatives  for leverage  purposes  is
specifically  prohibited.
Source: Federal Office of Social Insurance
77Table  27
Asset Allocation,  1970-1996
Assets  1970  1980  1987  1992  1994  1996
Liquid  Assets  7.0  6.0  9.1  8.3  7.1  9.5
Domestic  Bonds  25.0  28.0  30.2  24.2  21.3  19.7
Domestic  Loans  4.1  2.5  1.8
Domestic  Mortgages  15.0  10.0  7.6  9.2  8.3  7.0
Domestic  Real Estate  16.0  18.0  17.3  17.1  17.0  15.5
Claims  on Employers  :33.0  27.0  16.6  14.7  12.3  10.2
Employer  Equity  2.5  2.4
Domestic  Equities  3.0  9.0  7.9  8.3  10.1  11.4
Foreign  Equities  2.5  5.3  7.6
Foreign  Bonds  in For Curr  4.9  7.0  8.0
Foreign  Bonds  in CHF  4.1  3.0  3.3
Indirect  Investments*  5.8
Other  1.0  2.0  5.5  5.1  3.6  3.0
Total  1(0.0  100.0  100.0  100.0  100.0  100.0
Total Assets  (CHF  bn)  32.5  82.0  165.2  256.7  296.1  348.3
Total Assets/GDP  (%}  35.8  45.5  64.2  75.0  82.8  95.2
Total Pension  Reserves  157.4  242.5  271.4  311.6
Total Equities  :3.0  9.0  7.9  10.8  17.8  21.4
Total Foreign  7.4  12.3  15.6
Total Claims  on Employers  3:3.0  27.0  16.6  14.7  14.8  12.7
* Indirect investments were allocated in their respective asset classes in 1992, 94, and 96.
Source: Davis (1  995:134-143) for 1970 and 1980
Pension Fund Statistics, Federal Office of Statistics
Federal Office of Social Insurance
78Table 28






The Netherlands*  9.64
Switzerland  4.90
United Kingdom*  10.35
United States*  10.49
Prudent Person*  10.67
Asset Limits  5.92
Source: European Commission (1999)
Table 29
Large Pension Funds
Average Real Investment Returns, 1995-98
1995  1996  1997  1998  Average
Australia, Corporate  13.2  7.9  13.5  10.5  11.3
Australia, industry  10.3  7.9  11.0  9.1  9.6
Canada  15.2  25.0  15.3  7.2  15.5
Japan  10.0  5.2  3.1  -3.3  3.6
Switzerland  9.5  12.3  16.4  10.4  12.1
UK  16.3  8.1  16.8  11.6  13.1
US  22.3  10.8  18.9  13.0  16.2
Source: Pensions and Investments, second issue of following year
79Table 30
Administrative and Financial Costs
Administrative  Costs  Financial  Costs
% of  % of Average  % of  % of Average
Contributions  Assets  Contributions  Assets
1970  7.51
1978  5.42  0.72
1980  3.62  0.46
1987  2.25  0.28  1.72  0.21
1990  2.16  0.24  1.97  0.22
1992  2.43  0.24  2.26  0.22
1994  2.77  0.23  3.28  0.27
1995  2.86  0.22  3.27  0.26
1996  3.04  0.22  3.28  0.24
1997  3.31  0.22  3.31  0.22
Source: Pension Fund Statistics, Federal Office of Statistics
Federal Dffice of Social Insurance
Table 31
Premiums of Life Insurance Companies (% GDP)
Individual  Group  Other  Total
Life Policies  Annuities  Business
1950  1.7  0.2  0.4  2.3
1960  1.5  0.2  0.5  2.2
1970  1.2  1).  1  1.0  2.3
1980  1.2  0.2  1.5  2.9
1990  1.5  (.1  2.9  4.5
1995  2.5  0.5  3.7  6.7
1996  2.4  0.6  4.1  0.3  7.4
1997  3.0  0.6  4.5  0.3  8.3
1998  3.2  0.6  4.8  0.6  9.1
Source:  Federal Office  of Private  Insurance
80Table  32
Mathematical  Reserves  of Life  Insurance  Companies  (% GDP)
Individual  Group  Other  Total
Life Policies  Annuities  Business
1950  12.6  2.5  3.6  18.6
1960  11.0  1.5  4.3  16.9
1970  7.9  1.0  5.1  14.0
1980  7.3  1.3  8.4  17.0
1990  8.9  1.9  14.7  0.0  25.5
1995  12.2  2.7  19.9  0.5  35.3
1996  13.3  3.3  21.2  0.5  38.2
1997  15.0  3.6  22.9  0.8  42.3
1998  16.6  4.0  24.4  1.4  46.3
Source: Federal Office of Private Insurance
Table  33
Asset Allocation  of Life  Insurance  Companies
Debt  Equities  Real Estate
1950  90.0  10.0
1960  85.1  14.9
1970  79.8  20.2
1980  81.2  18.8
1990  79.5  5.8  14.7
1995  74.5  13.4  12.1
1996  73.2  15.6  11.2
1997  72.6  16.9  10.5
1998  72.1  18.3  9.6
Source:  Federal Office  of Private  Insurance
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